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Summary 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an econometric model which can be used to explain 
and determine the demand for cash in Norway, and to use this model to forecast the demand 
for cash in the period 2004.3-2007.4.  
 
From a central banks perspective, there is particularly one reason to be interested in the 
demand for cash. The central bank is the issuer of notes and coins. Since one of its objectives 
is to satisfy the demand for cash, it is of the central banks interest to ensure that they supply 
the society with notes and coins in the most efficient way. Obviously this is also of great 
importance for the society. For the central bank to do this, an efficient amount of notes and 
coins must be produced. In order to be able to plan the production in the best way, it is 
therefore of interest to investigate closer what determines the demand for cash. Further, one 
may also argue that it is of interest to investigate the demand for cash for monetary policy 
purposes. The reason for this is that the amount of cash held for transaction purposes is 
closely related to domestic spending, and hence to domestic price developments. 
 
The demand for cash increased steadily year by year until 1999, and has decreased somewhat 
since then. In the same period the use of alternative payment instruments, such as payment 
cards, increased rapidly. One would therefore expect that the use of cash should have been 
reduced dramatically, something that has not yet happened. This paper studies the 
determinants of cash demand in Norway during the period 1980-2004. A thorough discussion 
of the different determinants for cash demand is carried out. The starting point for the 
discussion is the concept of money and its role, the evolution of the payment system and 
theoretical models of money demand. Since most of the theoretical models of money demand 
focus on a quite narrow concept of money, it is believed that some of these models are also 
relevant when investigating the demand for cash. This seems to especially be the case for 
models considering the private households demand for money. Based on this discussion, 
empirical models of demand for real cash are developed. Rather than estimating the 
theoretical models themselves, they are used to determine which explanatory variables that 
should be considered when an empirical model is specified.  
 
In the empirical analysis, quarterly data and a general-to-specific approach are used. For this 
analysis I have used the software programs PcGive 10.1 and TSP 4.5. Due to problems with 
autocorrelation in the residuals and lack of data, a VAR model seems not appropriate to use 
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for estimating the demand for cash. Instead a single equation equilibrium correction model is 
used. Considering different initial models, eliminating insignificant variables and applying 
different statistical tests, suggests that there are two competitive, but also quite similar, 
models of relevance. Both models have only private point-of-sale consumption and real 
deposit interest rate as significant explanatory variables in addition to a linear trend, seasonal 
variables and impulse dummies. The rapid evolution in the payment system seems to have a 
negative effect on the demand for cash, which may dampen the increase in the demand for 
real cash. This effect is represented in the models by a negative linear trend.  
 
The estimation results show that the two models short-run effects differ slightly, while the 
long-run effects are quite similar. The long-run elasticity for consumption was found to be 
approximately 0.63 and the semi-elasticity for the interest rate was found to be approximately 
0.02 in both models. These results differ compared to the results obtained by Fischer, Köhler 
and Seitz (2004) for the Euro area.  
  
The explanatory variables were found to be weakly exogenous with respect to all parameters 
in the structural equation for real cash, validating a single equation approach. In addition to 
this, the highly significant equilibrium correction term suggests that an equilibrium correction 
model is appropriate.  
 
In order to choose between one of the two competitive models, parameter stability and ex post 
forecasting properties are investigated. However, this does not lead to a clear conclusion of 
which model to choose. Both models seem to have parameters that are reasonable stable. On 
the other side, both models have some problems when it comes to forecasting in the sample 
period 2002.1-2004.2. An explanation for this may be that this forecasting period was a rather 
turbulent period for the Norwegian economy. The main reason for this was probably that the 
economy needed some time to adjust to the change in the monetary policy regime in March 
2001. Since the model selection analysis gives no clear suggestion of which model to choose, 
both models are treated on an equal basis.       
  
For given evolution paths of the exogenous variables, ex ante forecasts for the period 2004.3-
2007.4 are obtained by the two models. In addition to this forecasts produced by a simple 
AR(8) model are also considered. The forecasts produced by the two competitive models that 
are developed, suggest that the demand for real cash will rise for the next couple of years, and 
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then slowly decrease from the end of 2006. In contrast to this the simple AR(8) model 
suggests that the demand for cash will increase throughout the whole forecasts period. In 
order to make the forecasts more robust for potential breaks, forecasts with intercept 
correction are conducted. Finally, I produce forecasts under alternative assumptions of the 
evolution paths of the exogenous variables.         
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1. Introduction 
Notes and coins are issued by Norges Bank and are legal tender in Norway. The currency 
component of the monetary aggregates is the narrowest definition of money analysed by 
central banks. It compromises notes and coins in circulation held by non-Monetary Financial 
Institutions. The total amount of currency in circulation (cash)TP1 PT is controlled by the monetary 
authorities. Central banks are in principle able to decide precisely the amount of currency they 
put into circulation and know the exact amount of outstanding currency. On the other hand, 
after the currency is put into circulation, central banks are not able to track notes and coins as 
it circulates. What characterizes cash is that it enables immediate final settlement without an 
intermediary. Consequently there is little direct statistical information on where the currency 
circulates, who holds the currency and for which reasons currency is held. 
 
Furthermore the amount of outstanding cash in Norway increased steadily year by year in the 
sample period until 1999, and has decreased somewhat since then. In the same period the use 
of alternative payment instruments, such as payment cards, increased rapidly. One would 
therefore expect that the use of cash should have been reduced dramatically, something that 
has not yet happened. A possible explanation for this might be that cash is commonly used in 
the unregistered (illegal) economy.  
 
From a central banks perspective, there is particularly one reason to be interested in the 
demand for cash. The central bank is the issuer of notes and coins. Since one of its objectives 
is to satisfy the demand for cash, it is of the central banks interest to ensure that they supply 
the society with notes and coins in the most efficient way. Obviously this is also of great 
importance for the society. For the central bank to do this, the correct amount of notes and 
coins must be produced. In order to be able to plan the production in the best way, it is 
therefore of interest to investigate closer what determines the demand for cash. Further, one 
may also argue that it is of interest to investigate the demand for cash for monetary policy 
purposes. The reason for this is that the amount of cash held for transaction purposes is 
closely related to domestic spending, and hence to domestic price developments. 
 
                                                 
TP
1
PT I will use the terms currency in circulation and cash as synonyms. They both stand for notes and coins in 
circulation.   
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The purpose of this paper is to provide an econometric model which can be used to explain 
and determine the demand for cash in Norway, and to use this model to forecast the demand 
for cash for the period 2004.3-2007.4.   
 
In the year 2007, Norges Banks will close down their printing press for bank notes.TP2 PT Norges 
Bank needs such a model for forecasts in their planning procedure when making future orders 
for banknotes. On the other hand, this paper concentrates on the total demand for cash, and 
does not focus on the demand for different denominations of coins and banknotes. 
 
Most papers in the literature on cash focus on the relation between currency holdings and the 
illegal economic activity, or on the influence of financial innovations on cash demand. Very 
few of them focus on developing empirical models for the demand for cash. The main reasons 
for this are probably lack of relevant data and the lack of explicit theories for the demand for 
cash. In the following I will give a brief summary of some of the main findings in the 
literature on cash. 
 
There are particularly two papers, which have been the main sources of inspiration for my 
analysis. These are both papers that focus on modelling the demand for cash. The first is 
Fischer, Köhler and Seitz (2004) who analyses the demand for currency in circulation in the 
euro area since the beginning of the 1980s. They estimate the demand for euro legacy 
currencies in total, and for small and large denominations within a VAR cointegration 
framework. The second is Drehmann and Goodhart (2000). Here international comparisons of 
currency demand equations are done. They use panel data to estimate the total demand for 
cash, as well as for high- and low-value notes. Furthermore, an important paper on cash 
usage, which however does not concentrate on estimating the demand for cash, is Rogoff 
(1998). He focuses on the underground demand for euro notes. The paper is primarily written 
in response to, and to criticize, the ECB decision of issuing large value euro notes.  
 
Another interesting study is Humphrey, Kim and Vale (2001). They studied the effects of 
using electronic payment instruments on the efficiency of the payment system, using 
Norwegian data from the period 1989-1995. Their starting point is that different payment 
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2
PT Coins are produced by Det Norske Myntverket AS since 2003. 
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services have different production costs. The results show that payment users are quite 
sensitive to relative prices that reflect the user costs. 
  
From earlier works at Norges Bank, two papers on cash are relevant. These papers are 
however, not directly relevant for the analysis that I have done, but serve as inspiration 
sources. Humphrey, Kaloudis and Øwre (2000) estimated the share of cash used in consumer 
transactions at points of sale in Norway in the period 1980-1999. The results showed that this 
share declined over the period as a result of the increased use of debit cards. This paper also 
contains forecasts for cash use in the future and estimates for total cash use in connection with 
both legal and illegal activities. Gresvik and Kaloudis (2001) tried to estimate the transaction 
motivated demand for cash in all sectors of the Norwegian economy. They find that only      
37 % of the total amount of outstanding currency can be explained by this motive in the year 
2000. They conclude that the rest of this amount stems from the unregistered economy. 
 
My thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives verbal discussion of money and the 
payment system. It discusses the concept of money, its role, interpretation and functions, with 
a particular view of money interpreted as cash. Further a brief explanation of the payment 
system, its role and development follows. Chapter 3 provides a brief summary of some of the 
major theories for the demand for money. In addition, a theoretical model which is especially 
derived for the demand for currency is presented. The model is based on the models in Rogoff 
(1998) and Fischer, Köhler and Seitz (2004). The econometric theory, method and tests that 
are used in the empirical part of the thesis are explained in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, two cash 
demand functions for the Norwegian economy are estimated. Chapter 6 presents some 
forecasts for the period 2004.3-2007.4 for the demand for cash in Norway. The empirical 
models from Chapter 5 are used in addition to a simple univariate model.TP3 PT Finally, Chapter 7 
draws some conclusions.   
 
2. Money and the payment system; its functions and development 
2.1 Introduction 
In Norway banknotes and coins are issued by Norges Bank. They are legal tender and can be 
used for all payment transactions where payer and payee meet. That is, both parts have the 
                                                 
TP
3
PT I have used the software programs PcGive 10.1 (see Hendry and Doornik (1996)) and TSP 4.5 (see Hall and 
Cummins (1999)) in the empirical analysis. 
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right to demand settlement in notes and coins.TP4 PT Cash is a mean of payment, and is therefore 
also a part of the payment system. In the last decades most payment systems in modern 
market economies have undergone major changes. Basically, the main part of these changes 
has been the replacement of paper-based instruments by the use of electronic based payment 
instruments. The Norwegian payment system is among the most efficient and well-developed 
payment systems in the world. Extensive use of electronic services, particularly internet 
banking and payment cards, provides customers with a wide range of services and has 
reduced bank’s costs. According to Norges Bank (2004a), the key factors in achieving an 
efficient payment system in Norway have been an infrastructure that facilitates economies of 
scale, prices that reflect the production cost of services and active competition on the supply 
side. 
 
2.2 What is money? 
If you ask any man or woman in the street, “what is money?” the typical response would 
probably consist of the person in question taking out his/her wallet and showing a colourful 
piece of paper with some numbers printed on it. However, an economist will show 
considerably less confidence if confronted with the same question. Instead of formulating a 
straight answer he or she will propose a number of functions performed by this elusive thing 
called “money”. In other words, instead of designating what money is, economists describe 
what money does, see Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002). John Hicks formulated this as: 
 
 “Money is what money does. Money is defined by its functions.”  Hicks (1967) 
 
In broad terms we can distinguish between three major functions of money, see McCallum 
(1989):  
 
- Money as a medium of exchange in economic transactions 
- Money as a medium of account 
- Money as a store of value 
  
                                                 
TP
4
PT However, the Norges Bank Act does include the provision that no one is obliged to accept more than twenty 
five coins and notes of each denomination in any one payment. 
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The first of the three major functions of money can be explained by comparing two different 
hypothetical economies. Assume that the first economy is a direct barter economy. That is, 
exchange of goods is carried out by means of direct barter of goods and services. The second 
economy features monetary exchange, where the special medium of exchange commodity is 
money. Comparing two such economies, we can clearly see why money is used in modern 
economies. In a barter economy each part of a transaction must agree on a medium of 
exchange that the other part accepts. In contrast, in a monetary economy, the parts settle in a 
generally accepted medium of exchange. Money can also be divided into smaller values that 
can be divided or added up as required. Hence money helps to facilitate transactions. 
Therefore a monetary system provides simplifications to a barter economy. The efficiency 
gain is that transactions can be made easier, which in turn may allow for a better division of 
labour, a more efficient economy and higher level of wealth, Norges Bank (2004a). A more 
thorough discussion of this is made in Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002). 
 
The second major function of money is that they serve as a medium of account. For an 
economy with N different commodities, there are N(N-1)/2 distinct relative prices. If all goods 
are expressed in terms of money and money is thus the medium of account, then only N 
different (absolute) prices for the different commodities need to be recorded. Thus if we 
consider an economy consisting of 100 different commodities (including money as one of the 
commodities), the number of relative prices are 4950. However, in a monetary economy it is 
natural to express the prices of each of the 99 other commodities in terms of money. 
Therefore market participants do not need to know all the 4950 relative prices they need only 
knowledge of the 99 money prices of the commodities. This simplification reflects the 
advantage of having a common unit of account.   
 
A third function of money is to serve as a store of value. In a monetary economy, money can 
be used to buy goods, not only today but also in the future. A stock of money can therefore be 
said to represent “future purchasing power”, Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002). In the future, 
money can be exchanged for goods, which can be consumed or used in the production 
process. Hence, money can therefore be used as a store of value. However, there are many 
other assets, such as bonds, company shares etc. which typically outperform money in this 
role, because they yield a positive rate of return which money does not. 
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We have seen above that a pure monetary economy helped to facilitate transactions compared 
to a pure barter economy. However, other generally accepted mediums of exchange existed 
before the appearance of money in the economy. Especially metals such as gold and silver 
have some of the same qualities as money. This made them particular suitable for use as a 
medium of exchange and also as a store of value. First, the quality is uniform and relatively 
easy to identify. Second, the value reflects the quantity and purity of the metal in question. 
Third, the metal is divisible and could therefore be adjusted to transactions of different values. 
Finally the value of the metal does not diminish over time and the metal is easy to transport 
due to its relatively high value for low volumes. However, the fact that money (interpreted as 
currency) has no other value in itself other than being the medium of exchange, makes it more 
suitable than gold and silver for this purpose. Metals such as gold and silver have a 
commodity value, for example they can be used for decorations and as jewelry, while coins 
and paper (banknotes) have no such value. Coins and banknotes can also be produced at 
extremely low costs, while extraction of gold and silver is a costly, time demanding and a 
complicated process. Extractions of these metals are also limited to a few specific geographic 
areas. On the other hand, gold and silver have an advantage compared to money (interpreted 
as currency). They can be used as a common medium of exchange all around the world. Most 
countries have specific currencies, which mean that to carry out a transaction in a foreign 
country, the money needs to be changed to the specific currency used in this country. This 
problem is however likely to have had less relevance in the last decade and in the future. For 
most European countries a specific reason for this is the introduction of a common currency, 
namely the Euro.  
 
When Norges Bank was founded in 1816, the Bank was given the sole right to issue 
banknotes and coins. First the Central Bank operated with the silver standard, in the notion 
that banknotes were guaranteed to be exchanged for par value in silver. In 1874 the silver 
standard was replaced by the gold standard, which was finally phased out in 1931. Today the 
value of a banknote or coin is based on the confidence in the issuer. This means that 
confidence in the central bank and the government is essential for the value of cash issued by 
the central bank and deposits held in the central bank accounts (central bank money).  
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2.3 How to measure money? 
As pointed out above, it can often be problematic to give a precise economic definition or 
explanation of what money is. If this is the case, it is also problematic to measure money. A 
fundamental question is; “What is, and what is not sufficiently liquid to be called money?”TP5 PT 
To avoid this problem, monetary aggregates are defined. However, the definition of these 
aggregates may differ between countries and over time. In this paper, the main focus is on 
currency in circulation. This is an extreme narrow definition of money. When economists 
normally refer to money, they often use broader definitions of money. It can therefore be 
useful to give an explanation of different monetary aggregates. I will here focus on the 
definitions used by ECB and Norges Bank. For the monetary aggregates M0 and M1, the 
same definition is used, but as will be seen below, they differ when it comes to the broader 
monetary aggregates. 
 
2.3.1 The monetary base M0 
From the perspective of commercial banks, a perfect substitute to currency in circulation, are 
reserves that these banks hold with the central bank. If a bank is in need of currency, it can 
always convert its reserves with the central bank into currency at negligible transaction costs. 
On the other hand, if a bank’s cash balances are too high, it can always exchange them for 
reserves. So, there is a perfect substitutability between reserves and currency. This concept of 
money is called the monetary base, and is defined as: 
 
M0 = currency in circulation + the value of bank’s reserves at the central bank. 
 
2.3.2 The money stock M1 
From the perspective of a private individual, an almost perfect substitute to currency in 
circulation is sight deposits. Overnight deposits can be transferred into currency at very low 
cost and almost at every time, due to the existence of cash dispensers. The sum of these two 
substitutes is often referred to as the money stock M1, and is defined as: 
 
M1 = currency in circulation + overnight deposits. 
 
                                                 
TP
5
PT By liquid, we understand: means that can directly be used as means of payments, or means that quickly and 
easily can be converted into means of payments. 
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2.3.3 Broader monetary aggregates M2 and M3 
The monetary stock M1 is often considered the most relevant monetary aggregate for 
theoretical models of money demand. Such models usually assume a quite narrow definition 
of money. However, when it comes to monetary policy most central banks usually use 
broader monetary aggregates, such as M2 and M3. Norges Bank puts most weight on M2, 
when they perform their monetary policy. In contrast, the European Central Bank (ECB) uses 
a “reference value” for the money stock M3 as a “pillar” of its stability oriented monetary 
policy strategy. Norges Bank defines their broad monetary aggregate M2 as follow. 
 
M2 = M1 + the money-holding sector's other bank deposits (in TNOKT and foreign currency) 
except restricted deposits (bank saving with tax credit etc.), incl. certificates of deposit.TP6 PT   
 
The ECB defines their broader aggregates as follows. 
 
M2 = M1 + deposits with agreed maturity up to 2 years TP7 PT 
 + deposits redeemable at notice up to three months.TP8 PT 
M3 = M2 + repurchase agreementsTP9 PT  
+ money market fund shares/units and money market paper 
+ debt securities issued with maturity up to 2 year.TP10 PT 
 
An illustration of the quantities of the monetary aggregates in Norway is given in Figure 1. As 
mentioned above, Norges Bank does not focus on the broad monetary aggregate M3, and it is 
therefore not illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
                                                 
TP
6
PT By money holding sector is here meant: local government, non-financial corporations, households and other 
financial corporations (Ti.e.T excluding banks and state lending institutions). 
TP
7
PT Consists mainly of time deposits with a given maturity which, depending on national practices, may be either 
not convertible prior to maturity or convertible only subject to a penalty, see ECB (1999, 2001) for more details. 
TP
8
PT Consists of savings deposits for which the holder has to respect a fixed period of notice (up to three months) 
before being able to withdraw funds. Also here it might be some cases where it is possible to withdraw a certain 
fixed amount in a specific period or an earlier withdrawal subject to a penalty payment, see ECB (1999, 2001) 
for more details.  
TP
9
PT An agreement whereby an asset is sold but the seller has a right and an obligation to repurchase it at a specific 
price on a future date or on demand, see ECB (1999, 2001) for more details. 
TP
10
PT It represents a promise to make regular payments for a specified period of time (here up to two years). See 
ECB (1999, 2001) for more details. 
  9
 
Source: Norges Bank 
 
From the definitions of these broader monetary aggregates, it is obvious that not all assets that 
are included can be regarded as perfect or close substitutes to currency in circulation. Further 
it might also be problematic that these monetary aggregates do not coincide with the 
definition of money that is often used in theoretical models. However, M2 and M3 have 
statistical advantages, that is the demand for M2 and M3 are more stable than the demand for 
narrow money (M0 or M1). This makes the broader monetary aggregates more appropriate to 
use as leading indicators for the development in the price level. A more thorough explanation 
of this can be found in ECB (1999, 2001). 
 
2.4 The role and functions of the payment system 
As pointed out in Norges Bank (2004a), it is of great importance for all well-developed 
countries to have an efficient payment system. But what does it actually mean that a payment 
system is efficient? According to Norges Bank, what characterizes an efficient payment 
system is that transactions have to be effected quickly, securely and at low costs.TP11 PT Most 
individuals and companies use the payment system every day in one way or another. 
Payments are often made by cash or other payment instruments that provide access to money 
in an account. Therefore an efficient and secure transfer of means of payment is essential for 
the execution of different capital transactions, the settlement of foreign exchange rate and in 
connection with the implementation of monetary and fiscal policy, Norges Bank (2004b).  
 
                                                 
TP
11
PT This is Norges Banks definition of an efficient payment system, and is more thoroughly explained in Norges 
Bank (2001) and Norges Bank (2004b).  
Figure 1:  Monetary aggregates 1993-2003. Annual average in billions of NOK 
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M0 
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In Norway, retail payments are executed using cash and/or deposit money. Cash (notes and 
coins) is issued by Norges Bank and is legal tender in Norway. Cash therefore represents a 
claim on Norges Bank. On the other hand, deposit money represents a claim on banks. Claims 
are settled by making assets available for payee. 
 
The Norwegian payment system consists primarily of systems of transferring deposit money 
from payer to payee by means of various payment instruments such as giros, payment cards 
and cheques. Banks play an important role in the payment system since they have a statutory 
monopoly on receiving deposits from the public, and bank deposits provide the basis for most 
payment transactions. Cash payments do not involve any payment transfer services since the 
final settlement is made without an intermediary. 
 
The payment system may be divided into two main parts; system of payment services and the 
interbank system (see Figure 2). Payment services involve the use and provision of card 
services, cheques, giros and cash to execute retail payments. The interbank system is a system 
for clearing and settlement of transactions between banks.TP12 PT Payment transactions go through 
the entire system before reaching the payee, unless the payer and payee have accounts in the 
same bank, or a bank acts as a settlement bank, which is the case for among others DnB NOR. 
However, since this paper focus on demand for cash, I will only look at the system for 
payment services and not the interbank system. 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
12
PT An overview of the Norwegian interbank system is given in Norges Bank (2004b) 
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Figure 2: The Payment system in Norway 
Source: Norges Bank 
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2.5 Payment services: Cash and its alternatives 
As mentioned, coins and banknotes are issued by Norges Bank and both payer and payee have 
the right to demand settlement in notes and coins. What characterizes cash is that it enables 
immediate final settlement without an intermediary. This property makes cash an attractive 
and flexible mean of payment, especially for small-value payments. A study by Gresvik and 
Kaloudis (2001) indicates that about a third of the total cash balance is used as payment for 
registered trade in goods and services. The remaining two thirds are used for non-registered 
purposes. Such purposes are either legal such as hoarding and private transactions, or illegal 
activities (tax evasion, crime etc.). Before going into more detail about cash and its 
alternatives it can be of some interest to take a closer look on how cash is distributed to the 
public and how it circulates, in other words: the cash flow cycle. 
 
2.5.1 The cash flow cycle      
To acquire cash and convert deposit money into cash, the infrastructure is vital. The most 
important aspects of the cash systems infrastructure are illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: The cash flow cycle 
 
 Source: Norges Bank 
 
Figure 3 gives a description of the cash flow cycle, which can be divided into two main parts, 
the small cash flow cycle and the large cash flow cycle. 
 
The small cash 
flow cycle BANK  
Norges Bank 
The large cash  
flow cycle 
COUNTER 
BUSINESS INDIVIDUALS
Payment terminals 
EFTPOS (Cash back) 
ATM NETWORK
Circulation channel that supplies cash in the large cash flow cycle 
Circulation channel that removes cash from the large cash flow cycle  
Circulation channel that does not change cash holdings in the large cash flow cycle
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The small cash flow cycle between the central bank and commercial banks comprises the 
system for producing, replacing, processing and supplying cash. Banks turn in excess cash 
holdings to Norges Bank and requisition cash when needed (this is explained in more detail in 
the next section). Nearly all banks have accounts in Norges Bank in connection with cash 
deposits and withdrawals; see Norges Bank (2001). 
 
In the large cash flow cycle, banknotes and coins circulate. The circulation is primarily 
between banks, enterprises and households/individuals. There are three main channels of how 
cash is supplied and put into the system. An individual can either acquire cash by going to the 
bank, from cash dispensers (ATMs) or in shops with payment terminals (cash back). This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The red arrows show cash that enters the large cash flow cycle through 
withdrawals from ATMs and bank/post offices. Both withdrawals and cash back in 
connection with goods purchases represent conversion from deposit money to cash. However, 
cash back in connection with goods purchases does not supply new banknotes of coins to the 
large cash flow cycle because the cash is already supplied to the shops. The opposite case is 
illustrated by the blue arrows. They show cash on its way out of the large and into the small 
cash flow cycle, in other words enterprise and household sectors’ payment of cash to banks. 
Finally the black arrows represent transactions that keep cash in circulation among members 
of the public.  
 
2.5.2 What is currency in circulation? 
The cash flow cycle explains how people acquire cash and how deposit money can be 
converted into cash. However, since this paper focus on notes and coins in circulation, it is 
important to distinguish between cash that circulates and cash that are held by Norges Bank. 
This relates to the discussion in Section 2.3.1 (on the monetary base M0). As explained there, 
a commercial bank has a perfect substitute to notes and coins in circulation, which is to place 
cash reserves in Norges Bank. Since banks are risk averse and earn interest on their cash 
reserve at Norges Bank, they want to minimize their cash holdings. Therefore they place their 
excess cash holdings in cash reserves at Norges Bank. This cash is withdrawn from 
circulation. To get the cash back in circulation again, the bank withdraw money from their 
reserves (held at Norges Bank). The banks then distribute the cash to their branches and into 
the large cash flow cycle. The red line in Figure 4 illustrates the distinction between cash that 
circulates and cash that are not in circulation.        
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Figure 4: Cash in circulation 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
 
2.5.3 The use of cash in different type of transactions 
As mentioned above, cash enables immediate final settlement without an intermediary, which 
makes cash especially attractive as a mean of payment for small-value payments. As 
motivated in Humphrey, Kim and Vale (2001), the demand for payment instruments are 
derived from their use in transactions. They divide transactions into four different types: 
  
1. Point-of-sale payments for food, clothing, transportation, entertainment and other 
retail purchases. 
2. Bill payments for rent, mortgage, utilities, insurance, etc. 
3. Disbursements for payroll, retirement, social benefits, etc. 
4. Financial payments for interbusiness transactions, bank funding, government 
securities, foreign exchange, stock and commodity market transactions, etc. 
 
Due to the rapid evolution of the payment system in Norway, it is likely that use of cash is 
only appropriate for the first type of these transactions, namely point-of-sale transactions. The 
alternative to cash in point-of-sale transactions is use of deposit money.TP13 PT Especially the use 
of payment cards can be considered as a substitute for cash in point-of-sale transactions.  
 
                                                 
TP
13
PT See Section 2.3.2 on the money stock M1. 
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2.6 Cash and the payment system: trends and developments 
To illustrate roughly the main trends in the Norwegian payment system, we consider three 
figures. Figure 5 shows the share of cash in relation to GDP and the number of card payments 
per inhabitant in some European Union countries, the US and Norway.  As we can see, most 
European Union countries have a higher share of cash in relation to GDP than Norway. There 
is also a tendency for countries with widespread card usage to have a lower cash share. 
However, this does not necessarily indicate cause and effect. In addition to the existence of 
alternatives to cash, cash holdings are also influenced, among other things, by the velocity of 
cash circulation.TP14 PT 
  
 
Further, as can be seen from Figure 6, the use of electronic payment instruments has grown 
rapidly through the last decade. In 1994 about 40 percent of all transactions where electronic 
based, and in 2003 electronic based transactions had risen to almost 90 per cent of all 
transactions. However, be aware that not all electronic payment instruments are substitutes to 
cash.TP15 PT Furthermore, the figure gives an illustration of the development in the payment 
system.  
 
                                                 
TP
14
PT The concept velocity will be explained in Section 3.3. 
TP
15
PT In fact, as discussed later, it is likely that payment cards are the only true substitute to cash. 
Figure 5: Banknotes and coins in circulation and 
payments by cards, international comparison 2001 
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The declining ratio of notes and coins in circulation to the monetary aggregate M1, to 
household consumption and to mainland GDP, may also reflect the increased use of cashless 
payment instruments. 
 
 
 
2.6.1 Cash 
The use of cash and deposit money for transaction purposes is influenced by both trends in 
household consumption and the costs involved in acquisition and development of alternative 
means of payment. 
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Figure 7: Value of notes and coins in circulation 
as a share of M1, household consumption and 
mainland GDP 1994-2003. Per cent 
Source: Statistics Norway og Norges Bank 
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The total nominal value of notes and coins in circulation increased every year in the period 
1980-1999, even though the use of alternative payment services such as credit and debit cards 
increased rapidly. In 1999 the total value of cash in circulation (average value per year) 
reached its maximum at 43.8 billion NOK. TP16 PT Thereafter the average value per year has 
decreased slightly.  In 2003, the total value of cash in circulation was 41.6 billion NOK, with 
banknotes accounting for 37.5 billion NOK and coins for 4.1 billion NOK. This is illustrated 
in Figure 8.   
 
  
   
One aspect that is likely to have an influence on the use of cash for transactions purposes is 
the access to cash. As explained in Section 2.5.1. there are three main channels of how cash is 
distributed to the public. The development in these main channels (in addition to the 
development in alternative payment instruments which is discussed below) is therefore likely 
to have an influence on the use of cash. In the last decade the number of bank branches has 
declined slowly. The number of ATMs increased steadily until 2002 and has slowly been 
reduced since then. However, the main development which has made cash much more 
accessible over the last decade is the introduction of cash back from payment terminals. Cash 
back in connection with good purchases has become an important channel for acquiring cash. 
In 2000 this accounted for around 43 per cent of all cash withdrawals in Norway. This amount 
                                                 
TP
16
PT NOK = Norwegian Kroner 
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Figure 8: Cash in circulation 1994-2003. Annual 
average. In billions of NOK 
Source: Norges Bank 
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had increased to almost 56 per cent in 2003.  An illustration of the number of cash 
withdrawals divided into the three channels (for acquiring cash) is given in Figure 9. 
  
  
 
Another aspect that is also likely to have an influence on the use of cash is the illegal 
economy. The importance of cash for transactions in the illegal economy is a familiar 
phenomenon. As mentioned above, cash enables immediate final settlement without an 
intermediary, which makes cash perfectly suitable for use as mean of payment in illegal 
activities. There exist several papers in the literature, concerning the use of cash in illegal 
activities. A good illustration of this is given in Rogoff (1998). However because of lack of 
information and data about the illegal economy it will not be further elaborated in this paper.TP17 PT 
 
2.6.2 Alternatives to cash 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the increasing use of cashless payment instruments may 
have contributed towards reducing the demand for cash for transaction purposes. In particular 
use of payment cards is a substitute to cash payments since they are mainly used for small and 
medium-value purchases. As can be seen from Figure 10, the use of payment cards has 
increased considerably in Norway in the second half of the 1990s.  
 
                                                 
TP
17
PT However, as can be seen in the chapters below, I will discuss variables that may capture the effect of the 
underground economy on the use of cash.  
Figure 9: Number of cash withdrawals in Norway 
2000-2003. In millions of withdrawals
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Figure 10 also shows the development in use of giros and cheques as payment instruments. 
The use of giro has increased significantly over the last ten years. However, giro is often not 
considered as a substitute to cash, and is therefore not further discussed in this paper.TP18 PT As can 
also be seen the use of cheques have declined rapidly over the last decades, and now only 
accounts for about 0.1 per cent of all cashless payment transactions in Norway. The main 
reason that payment cards now can be considered as a substitute for cash is the rapid increase 
in point-of-sale terminals that accept payment cards. This has also lead to a rapid increase in 
the widespread of payment cards. There are few other countries where payment cards are used 
more often than in Norway.  At the end of 2003 the total number of payment cards issued to 
Norwegian citizens where more than 6.9 million.TP19 PT This is more than twice as much as in 
1994. Further there were over 91 000 point-of-sale terminals (EFTPOSTP20 PT payment terminals) 
that accepted payment cards in just under 60 000 locations at the end of 2003, which also is 
more than twice as many as in 1994. An illustration of this is given in Figure 11. 
 
                                                 
TP
18
PT For a detailed discussion on the development in giro payments in Norway, see Norges Bank (2004b) 
TP
19
PT This is the number of “pure” cards (excluding oil companies’ cards). That is, many of these cards are so-called 
double cards. This means that the card for example is both a bank card and a VISA. For a further discussion and 
explanation of different types of payment cards, see Norges Bank (2004a). 
TP
20
PT EFTPOS = Electronic Funds Transfers at Point of Sale 
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3. Theory of money demand 
3.1 Introduction 
In the literature there exist several different theories about the demand for money. Most 
theories are closely related to functions and the definition of money. Thus, the demand for 
money will be different depending on the combinations of assets that are included in the 
specific monetary aggregate. This means that a theory for money demand, using a broad 
monetary aggregate (M3), might be inappropriate when considering a more narrow monetary 
aggregate (M1). In this paper the focus is on demand for cash, leading us to a very narrow 
definition of money. Most of the literature on demand for money focuses on a broader 
definition of money. There exists very little literature considering demand for currency, and 
the literature that exists is mainly empirically oriented. However, some theoretical work has 
been done. Further the standard theoretical approaches to the demand for money do focus on a 
narrow concept of money, usually defined as the money stock M1. Thus, in the basic models 
it is assumed that money is a non-interest-bearing asset. This indicates that using basic models 
can be applicable for estimating demand for currency. 
  
In this section I will first give a brief theoretical explanation of how economists motivate that 
people holds money. I will here go deeper into the functions and properties of money. Further, 
I will briefly explain two models of money demand, which often appears in economic 
0
10 000
20 000
30 000
40 000
50 000
60 000
70 000
80 000
90 000
100 000
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Figure 11: No. of EFTPOS payment terminals 1994-2003
Source: Norges Bank 
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textbooks. Finally, I will present a theoretical model for currency demand, based on models in 
Rogoff (1998) and Fischer, Köhler and Seitz (2004)  
 
3.2 The properties of money 
Why do people hold money, even though it does not pay interest? This is a fundamental 
question in macroeconomic theory. In this section I will try to explain economists thought of 
the determinants of the quantity of money demanded by private agents. Private agent decision 
of their demand for money will typically give rise to a choice problem. This choice problem 
involves the following consideration: for a given amount of wealth, individuals will normally 
wish to hold only a fraction of it in form of money. The remainder is held in the form of other 
assets such as bonds, stocks, houses etc. Every individual then has the opportunity to hold 
more money at a present time if it chooses to hold less of its wealth in other assets. 
  
Cash pays no interest, while there are other assets that pay positive interests. So why are 
people then willing to hold money at all? The reason that people hold money is that it helps 
facilitate transactions. So the role of money as a medium of exchange is of great importance 
when considering why people want to hold a fraction of their wealth in money. This gives rise 
to an optimization problem – that of balancing the expected transactional benefits of holding 
an additional unit of money against the cost of doing so, which is the extra interest forgone.  
 
From this tradeoff, the main characteristics of the demand for money by an individual at a 
point in time can be deduced. We can structure it as the following three characteristics, see 
McCallum (1989).  
 
1. Since the purpose of holding money is to facilitate planned transactions, more 
money will be held the greater is the volume of transactions planned.   
 
2. Since it is the real quantities of goods and services that people care about, the 
relevant quantity of money demanded will be expressed in real (price deflated) terms. 
That is, the behavioral relationship to be studied relates real money balances 
demanded to real transactions planned. 
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3. Since the drawback to holding money – the cost – is the interest sacrificed, the (real) 
quantity willingly held will be smaller the higher is the rate of interest on alternative 
assets. 
 
We can now formally express these three properties in terms of a function relating the 
quantity of real money demanded by a representative person at time t, M Bt B/PBt B, to his planned 
real spending during period t, YBt B, and the prevailing rate of interest on some relevant asset, iBt B. 
If we now let L denote the function, we can assume that the person’s money demand behavior 
satisfies 
 
     ( )tt
t
t iYL
P
M
,= .      (1) 
      
For this equation to satisfy the three characteristics above, L must be increasing in YBt B and 
decreasing in i Bt B. In other words we have to assume that LB1 B(YBt B, i Bt B)>0 and LB2 B(YBt B, i Bt B)<0.TP21 PT 
 
3.3 Quantity theory 
As mentioned above, there exist many different theoretical models considering private agents 
demand for money. The quantity theory of money can be regarded as the earliest explanation 
of the demand for money. Its starting point is the so-called equation of exchange, which was 
developed by Fisher (1911).  
 
    tttt TPVM ≡ .       (2) 
 
Here MBt B is the quantity of money, VBt B is the transactions velocity, PBt B is the price level, and TBt B is 
the volume of transactions. The transactions velocity is the ratio of total transactions to money 
balances.  Since it is difficult to find reliable statistical information on the volume of 
transactions, and it is assumed that the volume of transactions moves more or less in parallel 
with real GDP, the standard form of the quantity theory is: 
 
    tttt YPVM ≡ .       (3) 
 
                                                 
TP
21
PT LBjB(Y BtB, iBtB) denotes the partial derivative with respect to argument j.  
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The income velocity of money, VBt B, measures the number of times the stock of money is turned 
over per period in financing the periodical flow of income. It is therefore equal to the ratio of 
GDP to the money stock. 
 
Both (2) and (3) are identities. For this to be a theory of money demand, it requires some 
assumption about the velocity. Early proponents of the quantity theory assumed that V would 
be a rather stable variable that is determined mainly by institutional features of a country’s 
payments system and by payment habits of its inhabitants. Therefore the velocity is regarded 
as a constant. The quantity theory can then be formulated as a theory of the demand for 
money.   
    t
t
t Y
VP
M 1
= ,       (4) 
  
where V denotes a constant velocity of money. This equation gives us two important elements 
for any theory of money demand, see Bonfinger (2001). It shows that the demand for money: 
 
1. Is proportional to the amount of real transactions, represented by the GDP 
 
2. Is proportional to the price level (the elasticity of nominal money with respect to 
the price level is one). An interpretation is that the demand for money is actually a 
demand for real money. 
 
A newer and more sophisticated approach is followed by Milton Friedman; see for example 
Friedman (1956). Here the velocity is no longer a constant but is assumed to be a function of 
the real interest rate. The demand for real money can then be written as: 
 
    t
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M
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1
= .        (5) 
 
Today the quantity theory still plays an important role in economics, however now more as a 
building block for more complex approaches, see Bonfinger (2001).   
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3.4 Baumol-Tobin inventory model 
Another, also quite simple model that is often presented in most textbooks on monetary theory 
(see e.g. Bonfinger (2001)) is the Baumol-Tobin inventory model, which was developed by 
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). This is a model where only the transaction motive is taken 
into account, that is, people hold money because they want to use it for payments.  This model 
applies mainly to a narrow definition of money. In the model the assets are restricted to non-
interest-bearing money and interest-bearing bonds. Further it is assumed that the transfer for 
money into bonds is associated with fixed transactions costs (c). The model derives the 
optimal money holdings for a household that receives a monthly income which is completely 
spent on the purchase of goods and services (PY). It is assumed that the purchases are spread 
evenly in time throughout the month. Every month the household receives the income in form 
of a cheque. In order to credit this to its account, the individual must go to the bank. At the 
beginning of the month the money stock (M) of each household is therefore given by 
 
    PYM = .       (6) 
 
Further the household is now confronted with the following decision problem. It can convert 
parts of the money stock into bonds, which will give an interest income. However there are 
also transaction costs for buying bonds. In this model both the optimum number of exchange 
transactions and the optimum average money holdings are determined. The average money 
holdings during the month is given by 
 
    
n
PYM
2
=  ,       (7) 
 
where n is the number of transactions. Further the total monthly costs of the payment services 
(PS) are  
    cnMiTCOCPS )1( −+=+= .    (8) 
 
Equation (8) says that the total costs of the payments services (PS) is equal to the opportunity 
costs of holding money (OC) and the monthly transaction costs (TC) for converting money 
into bonds. The opportunity cost of money is given by average money holdings (M) 
multiplied with the interest rate on bonds (i). The monthly transaction cost is given by (n-1) 
times the transaction cost c, where it is assumed that the transaction costs are independent of 
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the amount that is transferred and they are only required for the exchange of money into 
bonds.  By solving (7) for n and inserting this result into (8) gives us 
 
    c
M
PYcMiPS −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+=
2
.     (9) 
 
Cost minimization is then obtained by differentiating PS with respect to M and setting the 
resulting equation equal to zero. The first order condition of the optimization problem, which 
represents the optimal real money stock, is then given by: 
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⎛ ∗ .      (10) 
 
Here 
P
ccR =  represents real transactions costs. 
 
The main results of the Baumol-Tobin model are that the demand for non-interest-bearing 
money depends: 
 
1. Positively on the real income. But in contrast to the quantity theory, the relationship 
is not proportional. 
 
2. Negatively on the interest rate of bonds. 
 
3. Positively on the real transactions costs. In fact when the transactions costs become 
very small, the demand for non-interest bearing money goes to zero. 
 
Even though the Baumol-Tobin model seems to be relevant for describing a narrow money 
aggregate (and then also currency demand), its assumptions seem highly artificial and almost 
unrelated to reality (see McCallum (1989)). It is therefore preferable to focus on a different 
model that is more general than the Baumol-Tobin model. In the next section I will therefore 
focus on such a model. The model I will present is a version of a more general model. This 
version is especially derived for analyzing the demand for currency.    
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3.5 A theoretical model of currency demand 
The empirical literature on currency demand has already recognized the importance of 
currency use in the underground economy. However, the theoretical treatments of money 
demand and optimal inflation taxation have remained curiously oblivious to this possibility, 
see Rogoff (1998). The model that is presented, is a model that in addition to the effects 
included in Equation (1), tries to capture the presence of tax evasion or underground 
economic activities on the demand for currency. The model concentrates on a specific 
theoretical model, the so-called money-in-the-utility-function model. It captures the role of 
money as a store of values as well as a medium of exchange. The model is based on the 
models in Rogoff (1998) and Fischer, Köhler and Seitz (2004). TP22 PT The aim of the model is to 
derive which variables that should be incorporated in an empirical currency demand model. 
 
Consider an economy where the domestic currency is the sole legal tender. Lifetime 
individual utility, U, is given by the discounted sum of per period utility functions of the 
representative agent. This is represented in Equation (11)  
 
    ∑∞
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In Equation (11) CBt B is consumption in period t, MBt+1B denotes the nominal currency stock held 
between period t and t+1 and PBt B is the price level. It is assumed thatP Pu is strictly concave with 
uBi B > 0 and uBiiB < 0,TP23 PT where i = 1, 2. The parameter β is a discount factor that is positive but 
smaller than unity. Thus the household has positive time preferences and “discounts the 
future” in the sense that the utility it receives in t from a given CBt B and 
t
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TP
22
PT Fischer, Köhler and Seitz (2004), consider a slightly different model. They consider a small open economy, 
where some of the demand for the domestic currency comes from abroad. However, since only a very small 
fraction of the total Norwegian currencies in circulation is held abroad (Statistics Norway has estimated it to be 
about 0.7 per cent of the total currencies in circulation, see Gresvik and Kaloudis (2001)), I will not focus on 
this. 
 
TP
23
PT uBiiB, denotes the double derivative, with respect to argument i.  
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In this model people hold currency because real balances are an argument of the utility 
function. This approach underpins an implicit assumption that agents gain utility from both 
consumption and leisure. Real currency balances enters the utility function directly because it 
allow agents to save time in conducting their transactions. Therefore the model capture 
currency’s role as a store of value and as a medium of exchange. 
 
In order to make the model as simple as possible, the individual is in each period endowed 
with a fixed and time-invariant gross real income, Y. It also faces a proportional tax on earned 
income at a notational rate τ. The tax rate is notional in that the agent can reduce its effective 
tax rate by holding a higher level of real currency levels, M/P. This should capture the idea 
that using currency helps avoiding the detection of income by tax authorities. Thus, net real 
taxes paid by the individual are: 
  ⎟⎟⎠
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In other words, the value of g must lie in the interval [0,1]. Our assumptions on the tax 
evasion technology implies that the individual’s budget constraint in nominal terms for any 
time t may be written as 
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Here, BBt B is the real value of one-period bond holdings that mature at the beginning of period t, 
denominated in units of time-t consumption. r Bt B represents the real interest rate and is the rate 
of return on bonds held from period t to period t+1.TP24 PT  Note finally that the individual begins 
period t with asset stocks BBt B and M Bt B. In (12) the left hand side totals expenditures on 
consumption and bonds during t, plus currency balances held at the end of the period. 
Similarly the right hand side in (12) totals the resources available to the household from 
current income, currency that is brought into the period and bonds purchased (loans made) in 
the past, in other words sources of wealth. To assure a bounded budget set, we have to assume 
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PT This differs from Rogoff (1998) and Fischer, Köhler and Seitz (2004), who both assume a constant real 
interest rate  
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PT That is, the real gross return on 
money held from t to t+1 (RBm,t B) must be less or equal to the real gross return on bonds held 
from t to t+1 (RBt B). Otherwise agents would be able to make infinite profits by choosing 
arbitrarily large money holdings financed by issuing bonds. In other words, the nominal 
interest rate i Bt+1B cannot be negative.TP26 PT  
 
Further, the household’s object is for a given price system{ }∞
=0ttr , { }∞=0ttP  and initial money MB0 B 
and bonds BB0 B, to maximize (11) by choosing a sequence{ }∞
=++ 01t1tt B ,M ,C t  subject to the 
budget constraint (12). We can then formulate the following Lagrangian: 
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Maximization of (13) gives us the following first order conditions: 
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Acknowledging that (14) is an identity in time and rearranging yields: 
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PT Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) give a formal and detailed explanation of this condition.  
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This means that the following must hold: 
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Further, if we rearrange (16) we get: 
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Dividing (18) by (19), inserting for equation (20) and rearranging give us 
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Finally if we now insert (18) and (19) into equation (15) and rearrange, we get the following 
equation: 
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Condition (21) is the standard consumption-Euler equation. It states that at a utility maximum 
the consumer cannot gain from shifts of consumption between periods. Equation (22) 
determines the allocation of income between money and consumption. I will now take a 
closer look at the equation:  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+ + )('11 1
YP
M
g
P t
t
t
τ  is the quantity of current consumption a 
person must forgo to raise real balances by one unit,TP27 PT and uBC B(.) is the marginal utility of that 
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27
PT This expression is less than 1/PBtB. The reason for this is that when holding a larger amount in terms of money 
(currency), one pays less tax (tax evasion). Therefore a person must forgo a smaller amount of current 
consumption than in a case without such taxes, to raise real balances by one unit.  
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consumption. On the right-hand side, the first term is the marginal utility the agent gets from 
having one extra currency unit to conduct transactions. Breaking down the second term on the 
right hand side, 1/PBt+1 B is the quantity of consumption the individual will be able to purchase in 
the period t+1 with an extra currency unit, βuBC B(.) is the marginal utility of date t+1 
consumption, discounted to period t.  
 
Combining (21) and (22) yields: 
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Equation (23) characterizes the optimal solution to the maximization problem. The equation 
has two endogenous variables. The solution to the optimization problem involve that the paths 
for CBt B, M Bt B, BBt B and λBt B are functions of τ, Y and the paths for rBt B and PBt B. Under certain parametric 
functions and together with a transversality condition it will be possible to calculate the 
explicit solutions.TP28 PT This will give a demand function for real balances which will be 
increasing in y and decreasing in nominal interest rate iBt B. The one important difference 
compared to the previous models in this chapter, is that money (currency) demand also 
depends positively on the marginal tax rate τ.  
 
4. Econometric methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed some theoretical models. In the next chapters the focus 
will be on the empirical investigation of the demand for currency in circulation. Often there is 
a gap between the theoretical model and the empirical model specification. One reason for 
this is that econometricians not only have to estimate the coefficients in a theoretical model, 
but also have to worry about the validity of the estimators. In other words, they must worry 
about serial correlation, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, simultaneity and so forth. 
Further some dynamic models such as the model in Section 3.5 do not have closed form 
                                                 
TP
28
PT This transversality condition says that the initial financial wealth plus the present discounted value of 
disposable income must be equal to the present discounted value of expenditure on consumption and on 
“renting” real balances. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for a detailed explanation. 
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solutions.TP29 PT Therefore it is difficult to give such models an empirical representation that 
coincides perfectly with the theoretical representation. It may therefore be argued that it is 
appropriate to use the theoretical models as references to which variables that should be 
included in the econometric specification of the model.  
 
Further, in this case, the focus is on demand for currency in circulation. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, there exist few theories that consider such a narrow definition of money. This 
feature combined with the fact that the development in the payment system have increased 
rapidly over the last decades, may lead us searching for “new” variables which are not 
represented in theoretical models, but are believed to influence the demand for currency in 
circulation. This is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give a clear overview of the econometric methodology that is 
used in the empirical investigation of demand for currency in circulation. I will first shortly 
motivate and explain the choice of methodology. Then I will give a brief explanation of the 
different steps in this procedure, explaining different statistical tests and statistical properties 
that are relevant for the empirical analysis presented in the next chapters.  
      
4.2 General-to-specific methodology 
The empirical investigation described in the next chapters, is based on the so-called general-
to-specific methodology.TP30 PT Basically the general-to-specific approach can be summarized in 
the following list of points, which the investigator should follow and work through, see 
Hendry and Krolzig (2001).  
 
- Start from a general dynamic statistical model (frequently this is a VAR model), 
which captures essential characteristics of the data. In other words a model which is 
congruent with data evidence. 
 
- Eliminate statistically insignificant variables by standard testing procedure to reduce 
its complexity. 
 
                                                 
TP
29
PT The money demand function was not given on explicit form. 
TP
30
PT This methodology is also often called the LSE methodology, and was developed by British econometricians at 
the London School of Economics in the 1950s and 1960s, see Gilbert (1986). 
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- Implement diagnostic tests to check the validity of the reductions to ensure 
congruency of the final model. 
 
- The model should encompass a wide range of other models. That is, it should be able 
to explain other models results. 
 
- Check the reliability of the model on sub-samples. This could for example be done by 
checking the in-sample forecasting properties of the model. 
 
The fact that the data generating process is uncertain and there exist few theoretical models 
for currency in circulation, makes the general-to-specific approach particularly appropriate to 
use in this case. However, the approach has some problems/limitations which make it difficult 
to stick fully to the list presented above. Especially one problem in relation to the use of a 
VAR model is of great concern. In fact this is a general problem concerning such class of 
models and was first pointed out by Christopher A. Sims who wrote that: 
 
“If every variable is allowed to influence every other with a distributed lag of 
reasonable length, without restrictions, the number of parameters grows with the 
square of the number of variables and quickly exhausts the degree of freedom”. 
Sims (1980, p. 16) 
 
This is a problem that is relevant in this paper. My aim was to start out with a “broad” VAR 
model, but due to problems with residual misspecification tests, especially due to 
autocorrelation, another type of model had to be considered. In my case, I have chosen to 
focus on a “broad” single equation specification. This gives a slightly different modelling 
procedure than I first had in mind. This is especially the case when considering whether the 
variables are cointegrated or not. In a VAR approach, this is usually done by applying the 
maximum likelihood based method used by Johansen (1988, 1991). There exist other methods 
which consider cointegration in a single equation approach. In my case, I will focus on the 
method presented in Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre (1998). This method is explained later in 
this chapter. 
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4.3 Integrated variables and unit root test 
The first step in the process is to specify a general statistical model. By general is meant a 
“broad” model existing of all the variables that are believed to influence the variable of 
interest. But before we can specify such a broad model, we want to assure that our variables 
are transformed such that they are at least weakly stationary. A process {yBt B} is said to be 
weakly stationary if the first and second order moments of the process exist and are time-
invariant. In other words: 
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Many economic variables exhibit stochastic trends, such as GDP and consumption, and are 
therefore not stationary. In other words they have at least one unit root. However, in many 
cases stationarity can be achieved by simple differencing. A non-stationary series is said to be 
integrated of order d, denoted I(d), if it becomes stationary after being differenced d times. 
When specifying a dynamic economic model we would like to have equations of only 
stationary variables on each side of the sign of equation. In other words we want to have a 
balanced equation. An important aspect is that in an equilibrium-correction model (will be 
explained below) the mapping to stationarity is obtained partly by differencing the variables 
and partly by a linear combination of level variables that cointegrates. The concept of 
cointegration will be explained in Section 4.5. 
 
In the empirical investigation one would like to test whether the variables have at least one 
unit root (non-stationary) or not (stationary). There exist a number of such unit root tests. 
However, I will only concentrate on one of them, namely the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test.  
 
4.3.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
The ADF test, see Dickey and Fuller (1981), takes the following equation as a starting point. 
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It is a one-sided test, which tests HB0B: β – 1 = 0 against HB1 B: β – 1 < 0. In other words the null 
hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root. A significant test statistic would then reject 
the null hypothesis and suggest stationarity. So if HB0 B is rejected, the variable is said to be 
stationary. If HB0 B is not rejected, there is at least one unit root and the variable is non-
stationary. Now, taking the first difference of the variable, we can apply the test procedure 
again. This time the null hypothesis is that the first difference of the variable has a unit root. If 
HB0 B is rejected, it can be concluded that the variable is I(1). If HB0 B can not be rejected the same 
procedure can be applied again, testing now whether the variable is I(2) or not. However, it is 
important to be aware of that the test is sensitive to the lag length. A maximum lag length of 
the variable that is tested should therefore be decided in advance. In my case, I have chosen 
the maximum lag length to be 5. The strategy is then to choose the specification with the 
highest significant lag length. Alternatively the lag length can be chosen by applying some 
information criteria, for instance the Akaike information criterion (AIC). Further, it is also 
important to notice that the critical values and the test statistic are sensitive to inclusions of a 
constant, or a constant and trend.TP31 PT 
 
4.4 Residual misspecification tests 
In this section I will give a brief explanation of the residual misspecification tests that are 
calculated by the software programme PcGive 10.1. This software programme is the one that 
is used in the empirical investigation presented in the next chapters. A further discussion and 
explanation of these tests can be found in Hendry and Doornik (1996). 
 
4.4.1 Error autocorrelation test (AR 1-5 test) 
This is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) type of test for rPth P order residual autocorrelation. It is 
distributed as χP2P(r) in large samples, under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. However 
due to better small sample properties an F-form of the test is suggested by Harvey (1981) and 
is therefore used. In my case, I have chosen a lag length of 5 lags. The test is based on a 
regression of the following equation: 
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TP
31
PT The critical values PcGive uses are not influenced by inclusion of seasonal dummies. 
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where tεˆ  represents the residuals based on the OLS regression of the structural equation. The 
following hypothesis is tested: HB0 B: 0=iβ , where i = 1,…,5 (no autocorrelation) against its 
alternative HB1 B: at least one of the β-parameters is different from zero. 
 
4.4.2 Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity test (ARCH 1-4 test) 
This is an LM type of test for ARCH-effects. It is based on the test outlined in Engle (1982). 
It tests the null hypothesis of no ARCH against its alternative where ARCH-effects are 
present. In my case, where a lag length of 4 is chosen, this can be represented by testing HB0 B: 
0=iγ , where i = 1,…,4  against HB1 B: at least one of the γ-s is different from zero in the model: 
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The test statistic is asymptotically χP2 P(4)-distributed in large samples under HB0 B, but again an F-
form of the test statistic is to be preferred due to better small-sample properties. 
 
4.4.3 Normality test 
This is a test, testing whether the skewness (3Prd P moment) and kurtosis (4Pth P moment) of the 
residuals corresponds to that of a normal distribution, against its alternative of non-normal 
residuals. The test statistic is based on the test statistic in Bowman and Shenton (1975), but 
with some slight modifications. The test reported in PcGive is fully described in Doornik and 
Hansen (1994). The test statistic is χP2 P(2)-distributed under HB0B. 
 
4.4.4 Test for Heteroscedasticity using squares 
This test is based on White (1980). It involves an auxiliary regression of { }2ˆtε  on the original 
regressors ( )itx  and all their squares ( )2itx .TP32 PT The null hypothesis is unconditional 
homoscedasticity and the alternative is that the variance of the{ }tε process depends on the 
                                                 
TP
32
PT If there is a large number of observations relative to the number of variables in the regression, PcGive also 
reports a second test for heteroscedasticity. This is a test based on an auxiliary regression of the squared residuals { }2ˆtε  on all squares and cross-products of the original regressors. 
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regressors ( )itx  and their squares ( )2itx . Again the F-form of the test is applied, due to its better 
small sample properties. 
 
4.4.5 Regression specification test (RESET) 
The RESET test, based on the test in Ramsey (1969), is a test for misspecification of the 
functional form. It tests the null hypothesis of correct specification of the model against the 
alternative that powers of tyˆ  such as ( ),....ˆ,ˆ 32 tt yy  have been omitted. It tests to see if the 
original linear form is incorrect, by adding powers of linear combinations of the right hand 
side variables. 
 
4.5 Equilibrium correction model (ECM) 
Given that the variables are non-stationary, that is they are not I(0), it is of interest to 
investigate whether they are cointegrated or not. Let us assume that we have two variables yBt B 
and xBt B, and that they are both integrated of order 1. Hence, the first differences of these 
variables are stationary. However there might exist a linear combination of the two variables 
yBt B and xBt B in levels that is stationary. If we assume that we have the following equation: 
 
( )212110 0,NID~ εσεεβββα tttttt whereyxxy ++++= −− .   (28) 
 
Then without loss of generality this model can be transformed to: 
 
( ) ttttt xyxy εδγβα +−+∆+=∆ −− 11 ,      (29) 
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Equation (29) is often called an equilibrium-correction equation, where the term ( )11 −− − tt xy δ  
is called an equilibrium-correction term (ECM). The ECM models have been of great interest 
for applied econometricians because of their ability to distinguish between short-run 
(immediate) and long-run effects of changes in the variables in a simple way. The ECM-term 
represents the long-run solution (equilibrium) of the model. That is what economists often 
refer to as “steady state”. The coefficient in front of the ECM-term may therefore be 
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interpreted as an adjustment coefficient.TP33 PT It tells us something about how the model reacts if 
we are in disequilibrium.  β represents the short-run (immediate) effect of a change in ∆xBt B. 
 
4.6 Test for cointegration in a single equation framework 
In this section I will, as mentioned above, focus on the test developed in Banerjee, Dolado and 
Mestre (1998). They have proposed a test for cointegration in a single equation framework 
under the assumptions that the regressors are weakly exogenous for the parameters of 
interest.TP34 PT The test is based upon the ordinary least squares coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable in an equilibrium correction model augmented with lags of the regressors. In other 
words the procedure depends upon the significance of the error-correction term in the ECM 
re-parameterization of the model. This is a one-sided test and can be represented by testing 
the following hypothesis: HB0 B: γ = 0 (no cointegration) against H B1 B: γ < 0 for the linear 
counterpart of Equation (29). 
 
In Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre (1998), limit distributions of the standardized coefficient and 
t-ratio versions of the ECM test under the null hypothesis of no cointegration is obtained and 
critical values are provided. The limit distributions do not depend upon nuisance parameters, 
but depends on the number of regressors and whether a deterministic trend is included or not 
(in addition to a constant) in the model. 
 
4.7 The concept of weak exogeneity and testing for weakly exogenous regressors 
In this paper, the focus is on finding a single equation model which gives the best possible 
representation of what determines the demand for real currency in circulation. However, a 
problem that often occurs in such single equation models is that not all the regressors can be 
considered as exogenous variables. Therefore one often considers a VAR model, which is a 
reduced form system, derived from a simultaneous system of equations. But as explained 
above, in this paper only a single equation model is investigated. If this single equation model 
is estimated conditional on the regressors, and the true process is determined in a 
simultaneous system of equations, the results from such estimation may be misleading. This is 
                                                 
TP
33
PT However, if lagged values of the dependent variable (∆yBt-1B,…, ∆yBt-pB) are included in the model, some 
carefulness about the use of the concept adjustment coefficient is needed. Since the adjustment process then also 
depends on the parameters that are in front of these lagged dependent variables.   
TP
34
PT The concept weak exogeneity is explained in Section 4.7. 
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because we then implicitly assume that knowledge of the processes generating the 
explanatory variables would carry no relevant information to the parameters of interest. 
 
However, sometimes it might be the case that some of the equations in such system have 
regressors that are so-called weakly exogenous. The concept of exogeneity is studied in detail 
in Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983).TP35 PT They refer to a variable as exogenous with respect to 
a particular parameter, if knowledge of the process generating the exogenous variables 
(denoted as the marginal processes) contains no information about that parameter. That is, if 
we consider a money demand equation, knowledge of the process generating consumption 
contains no information about the parameters in front of the exogenous variables in the 
structural equation. The consumption variable is then said to be weakly exogenous with 
respect to its parameter in the money demand function. If we are only interested in the money 
demand equation, the opposite case, where money demand is weakly exogenous for the 
parameters in the consumption function, do not necessarily have to hold. A more formal 
definition of weak exogeneity is provided by Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983).TP36 PT  
 
In our case, where the model which is considered is an equilibrium-correction model, one has 
to pay attention to both weak exogeneity for the short-run and the long-run (equilibrium-
correction term) parameters. I will now give a brief explanation of what is meant by weak 
exogeneity in an equilibrium-correction model. A more detailed explanation can be found in 
Boswijk and Urbain (1997).   
 
                                                 
TP
35
PT They distinguish between three different concepts of exogeneity; weak, strong and strictly. However, I will 
only focus on one of them, namely the concept of weak exogeneity. 
TP
36
PT This can shortly be explained as follow. Let ( )′= ttt zyx ,  be generated by the process with conditional 
density function ( )λ,1−tt XxD , where XBt-1B denotes the history of the variables x: ( )0211 ...,,, XxxX ttt −−− =  
and XB0B denotes the initial values for xB0B, xB-1 B etc. Then let the parameters Λ∈λ be partitioned into ( )21,λλ  to 
support the factorization ( ) ( ) ( )21111 ,,,, λλλ −−− = ttttttt XzDXzyDXxD . 
Definition: zBtB is weakly exogenous with respect to ψ over the sample period, where ψ denotes the parameter of 
interest, if and only if there exist a re-parameterization with ( )21 ,λλλ =  such that 
(i) ψ is a function of λB1B alone, 
(ii) ( )( )[ ]21 ;; λλ ttt zzy  operates as a sequential cut. 
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From a vector equilibrium-correction model (VECM) it is possible to partition the left hand 
side variable as ( )′′tt zy , so that yBt B is a scalar time series and zBt B is a k-dimensional vector time 
series (k = n -1). This gives the following conditional and marginal model: 
 
( )
( ) ttttt
tttttt
uzyz
uuzyy
211222
,2.121111
+′−+Γ=∆
+′+′−+′=∆
−−
−−
καω
ξκλωφ
.      (30) 
 
Here ( )′′∆′∆′∆′= +−− 111 ,...,, ptttt xxzHω  is the vector of included differenced regressors in the 
structural equation, with (unrestricted) parameter vector 1φ . H is a known design-matrix, 
which is included to ensure identification of the structural equation. For a more detailed 
explanation of this, see Boswijk and Urbain (1997). Further ( )′′∆′∆= +−− 112 ,..., pttt xxω is the 
corresponding regressor vector in the marginal model, with associated coefficient 
matrix ( )1,2212 ,..., −ΓΓ=Γ p . Finally 21122σξ −Σ= , where 122−Σ  and 21σ are parts from the 
covariance matrix of the structural model.TP37 PT In the conditional equation uB1.2,t B denotes the error 
in the equation for ∆yBt B after conditioning on ∆zBt B . The following null hypotheses of weak 
exogeneity can be formulated as: 
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Here ξ0H  represents the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity for the short-run parameters. 
α
0H , 
is the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity for the long-run parameters and finally 
0H represents the joint null hypothesis of weak exogeneity both for the short-run and the long-
run parameters.  
 
When testing for weak exogeneity of the regressors the test presented in Boswijk and Urbain 
(1997) is used. They suggest the following procedure for testing whether the regressors are 
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σ  is the covariance matrix of the structural model. A more detailed explanation of this and the 
relationship between the structural and reduced form model is given in Boswijk and Urbain (1997). 
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weakly stationary or not. First a structural (conditional) model and a marginal model should 
be estimated by (multivariate) least squares. Then the residuals ûB2t B from the marginal model 
and the lagged disequilibrium errors )ˆ(ˆ 111 −−− −= ttt zyv κ from the structural (conditional) 
model should be constructed. Next, calculate LMB1 B, the variable-addition test statistic for the 
significance of ûB2t B in the structural equation, and the statistic LMB2B for the significance of 1ˆ −tv  
in the marginal model. If exogeneity for the long-run parameters is maintained, and only 
exogeneity for the short-run parameters is to be tested, then LM B1 B is to be compared by critical 
values from χP2 P(k) distribution. If one wishes to test αB2 B = 0 while maintaining the orthogonality 
assumption σB21B = 0, LM B2 B should be compared with χP2 P(k) quantiles. Finally the joint hypothesis 
is tested by comparing LM = LM B1B + LMB2B with critical values from the χP2 P(2k) distribution.TP38 PT 
 
4.8 Parameter stability and Chow tests 
One criterion that should be fulfilled when selecting a model based on the general-to-specific 
approach is that the model should contain reasonably constant parameters. Parameter stability 
is of especially great interest if the model is to be used for forecast purposes. Therefore 
recursive estimates (with ± 2 standard errors) and sequences of Chow tests (scaled by their 1 
% critical values) will be considered. It will be appropriate to give a short explanation of the 
different Chow tests for structural changes. Further, in the PcGive output sequences of 
different variants of the Chow tests are computed. I will therefore give a brief explanation of 
how these sequences are computed. A more thorough explanation of these tests can be found 
in Maddala and Kim (1998). 
 
4.8.1 Chow break point test 
According to Hendry and Doornik (1996), this is considered as the main test of parameter 
constancy. Assume that we have one particular point in time (T), where we want to check 
whether a break has occurred or not. The idea of the test is then: estimate (separately) the 
model for the whole period and also for the sub-period before the break. Then compare 
whether the full sample estimation results differ much from the sub-sample estimation results. 
The test statistic can be written in the form: 
 
                                                 
TP
38
PT This assumes that the two tests have equal degrees of freedom. This is however not necessarily the case. If the 
degree of freedom differ in the two tests, the joint hypothesis will be χP2 P(kB1B+ kB2 B)-distributed.    
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Here RSSBT+HB is the residual sum of squares from the estimation of the whole period, and 
RSSBTB is the residual sum of squares from the estimation of the sub-period.TP39 PT The statistic is 
used to test the null hypothesis of no break in the parameters against the alternative hypothesis 
of changes in at least one parameter. The test statistic is asymptotically F distributed under HB0B, 
and the null hypothesis is rejected if λ B P B is too large, compared to the relevant critical value. 
 
4.8.2 Forecast test 
This is a test which follows from a 1-step ex-post forecast analysis, comparing residual 
variances within the estimation and forecast periods. The test statistic is given by: 
 
( ) 0
1
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2
2
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ˆ
HunderHe
HT
Tt
asymp
u
t∑+
+=
= χ
σ
ξ .      (32) 
 
In Equation (32) HTTtwherexye ttt ++=′−= ,...,1,βˆ  and represents the 1-step forecast 
error.TP40 PT Further 2ˆ uσ  represents the variance of the forecast error.TP
41
PT The null hypothesis is here 
no structural change in any parameter between the estimation and sample periods. Rejection 
of the null hypothesis is not crucial for model selection, but may imply that the model under 
study will not provide very accurate ex ante predictions, see Kiviet (1986). An approximate F-
equivalent test statistic can be written as: 
 
 ( ) 0,~1 HunderkTHFH asympF −= ξλ .      (33) 
 
The three variants of the tests that are briefly described below are the ones that are computed 
by PcGive.  
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T
t
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1
2εˆ . 
TP
40
PT βˆ is estimated using data up to period T. 
TP
41
PT Under the assumption that ( ) 0ˆvar ≈β . 
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4.8.3 Break-point Chow test (N↓ test) 
This is a sequence of break point F-tests, where the test statistic is F(T – t + 1, t – k – 1)- 
distributed for t = M,….,T. It is called N↓ because the number of forecasts goes from N = T – 
M + 1 to 1. The test statistic is given by: 
 
 
( )( )
( ) ( ) 01
1 1,1~
1
1
)( HunderkttTF
tTRSS
ktRSSRSSt asymp
t
tT
d −−−−+−
−−−
=
−
−λ . (34) 
 
Where t = M,…, T. The null hypothesis of no break in the parameters is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis of changes in at least one parameter. 
 
4.8.4 Forecast F-tests (N↑ test) 
This is a sequence of forecast F-tests, which are F(t – M + 1, M – k – 1) distributed for t = 
M,…,T. It is called N↑ since the forecast horizon increases from M to T. The model is tested 
over 1 to M – 1 periods against an alternative hypothesis that allows any form of change over 
M to T. The test statistic can be represented as: 
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where t = M,…,T. 
 
4.8.5 1-step Chow test 
This is a sequence of 1-step forecast tests that are F(1, t – k – 1)-distributed under the null 
hypothesis of constant parameters, for t = M,…..,T. The test statistic is given by: 
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where t = M,…,T. It is important to be aware of that normality of the dependent variable is 
needed for this statistic to be distributed as an F-statistic. 
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4.9 Forecasting 
In the empirical analysis, I will distinguish between two types of forecasts. The first type of 
forecast is so-called ex post forecasts (in-sample forecasts). These types of forecasts are used 
as a model selection/evaluation criterion. What is meant by ex post forecasts is simply that 
one uses a model to make forecasts when the observations are already known. That is, instead 
of estimate a model on the whole data sample, one retains some observations (for example the 
eight last observations when quarterly data are used) for ex post forecasts. By comparing 
these ex post forecasts with their respective actual values, one gets an impression of the 
forecasting properties of the models.  
 
The second type of forecasts is denoted ex ante forecasts (out-of-sample forecasts). Ex ante 
forecasts are often referred to as genuine forecasts, and represent what one normally thinks of 
as forecasts. In other words, they are forecasts made for periods beyond the data sample 
period. This type of forecasts is essential for the analysis made in Chapter 6. 
 
I will now give a brief explanation of some forecasting measures and tools that I will use in 
the next chapters.    
  
4.9.1 Conditional expectation (optimal predictor) 
Under the assumption that the first two moments exists, an h-step forecast can be calculated 
as the conditional expectation, given by [ ]θˆ,ˆ thttht YyEy ++ = . Here, ( ),.....,, 21 −−= tttt yyyY  
contains all the past information and ( )tt Yθθ ˆˆ =  are parameter estimates given the information 
up to time t. It can be shown that such forecasts are unbiased, see Clements and Hendry 
(1998) for proof. 
 
4.9.2 Mean square forecast error (MSFE) 
Further it can be shown (see for example Clements and Hendry (1998)), that no other 
predictor conditional on YBt B alone has a smaller mean square forecast error, in other words it is 
an efficient predictor. The mean square forecast error is often used as a measure of forecast 
accuracy, and for an h-step forecast it can be written as: 
 
[ ] ( )[ ]tththttthth YyyEYyM θθ ˆ,ˆˆ,ˆ 2+++ −= .        (37) 
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Since the conditional expectation both is unbiased and has the minimum MSFE, it is often 
referred to as an optimal predictor. 
 
The PcGive output reports the mean and the standard deviation of the forecast errors. In 
addition to these, it presents two other measures of forecast accuracy, the root mean square 
error (RMSE) and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). A very short explanation of 
these measures follows below. 
 
4.9.3 Root mean square error (RMSE) 
This is simply the root of the mean square error. The model is estimated up to period T. 1-step 
forecasts are then made for the periods T+1,…,T+H. The RMSE may therefore be written as: 
 
 ( )
2/1
1
21 ⎥⎦
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+=
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tt fyH
RMSE        (38) 
 
Here, H represents the forecast horizon, y Bt B the actual value and f Bt B the forecast for period t (t= 
T+1,…,T+H). 
 
4.9.4 Mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) 
This can be presented as 
 
 ∑+
+=
−
=
HT
Tt t
tt
y
fy
H
MAPE
1
100         (39) 
 
Again, H represents the forecast horizon, y Bt B the actual value and f Bt B the forecast for period t (t = 
T+1,…,T+H). For a more detailed explanation of RMSE and MAPE, see Makridakis, 
Wheelwright and Hyndman (1998). 
 
4.9.5 Intercept correction (setting the forecast back on track) 
This is a mechanism that forecasters often use and is often referred to as setting the model 
“back on track”. This is simply done by adding the residual of the current period to the next 
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period’s forecast for 1-step ahead forecasts. Hence, the adjustment to the forecast is based 
only on the forecast error in the current period. I will now give a short explanation of this 
mechanism.  
 
Assume that the data generating process (DGP) is given by: 
 
ttt vyy += −1ψ .            (40) 
 
Then a forecast for period T+1, based on information from period T is: 
 
 TT yy ψˆˆ 1 =+ ,          (41) 
 
where ψˆ  represents the estimated parameter value. The forecast error is then given by: 
 
 ( ) 1111 ˆˆˆ ++++ +−=−= TTTTT vyyye ψψ .      (42) 
 
The forecast from setting the model “back on track” is then: 
 
 TTT eyy +=
∗
+ ψˆˆ 1 ,         (43) 
 
with a forecast error 1ˆ +Te  given by: 
 
 ( ) 111111 ˆˆˆˆˆ +++∗++∗+ ∆=−=−+−=−= TTTTTTTTT eeeevyyye ψψ    (44) 
 
 
In this way, resetting the forecast has the property of inducing the difference in the original 
forecast error. It is also possible to apply the method of intercept correction when exogenous 
variables are included (see Chapter 6). For a more thorough explanation of intercept 
correction, see Clements and Hendry (1998). 
 
5. Estimating the demand for cash in Norway 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will give a presentation of the first part of the empirical investigation of the 
demand for cash. I will first give a description of the data used, and how the different 
variables are constructed. Then I will present econometric models of cash demand, derived by 
using this data and the econometric methods explained in the previous chapter. This chapter is 
linked to Chapter 3 in the way that most of the variables that are used in the empirical 
investigation are strongly connected to the variables that are present in the theories for money 
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demand, outlined in Chapter 3. However, the econometric models that are derived in this 
chapter are not empirical representations of these theoretical models.     
 
5.2 Data 
The empirical analysis is conducted using quarterly seasonally unadjusted data. The data 
period spans from 1980.1 – 2004.2. The variable to be explained is the total real currency 
holdings.TP42 PT That is, the variable to be explained does not only contain real balances held by 
private households, but the total holdings of real balances in the economy. In other words it is 
the total demand for real cash that is the variable of interest. Most of the data in the analysis is 
provided by Statistics Norway and databases in Norges Bank. Detailed data definitions and 
sources are provided in Appendix I. 
 
As motivated in previous chapters, there is no theoretical model which gives a clear 
specification of which variables that should be included or not. However, there exist some 
theoretical models that give suggestions to variables that at least should be considered in such 
a model specification. Further some other variables, which are not included in the theoretical 
models, are believed to have an influence on the demand for currency in circulation. Chapter 
2 gave an indication on which variables that may be appropriate to include in the empirical 
model.   
 
In general and according to the arguments put forward in chapters 2 and 3, there are three 
potential influences on the evolution of cash balances. Our regressors can therefore roughly 
be divided into three categories: general macroeconomic variables, technological (financial 
innovation) variables and informal economy activity variables, which mainly try to capture 
the effect of the illegal underground economy.  
 
5.2.1 Macroeconomic variables 
(i) Real interest rate 
The inclusion of this variable is based on the theoretical argument provided in Chapter 3. It 
represents an opportunity cost term, and is included in order to capture the effect that interest 
is sacrificed when holding money (cash). We would therefore expect a negative effect of this 
                                                 
TP
42
PT It is important to notice that the real currency holdings are calculated by deflating nominal currency holdings 
by the same price index as (POS) consumption (see explanation of this price index below).  
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variable on the demand for cash holdings. The interest rate used in this analysis, is a weighted 
average of deposit rates in different banks.TP43 PT This particular interest rate variable is chosen 
because it is believed that deposit money is the only “true” substitute to cash holdings. 
Therefore the opportunity cost of holding cash is expected to be best captured by using the 
banks deposit rate. Since real cash holdings are modelled, it may be appropriate to use the real 
interest deposit rate. The real deposit rate is constructed by subtracting the changes in 
consumer price index from the nominal deposit rate. 
 
(ii) Real private (point-of-sale) consumption 
This variable is included for theoretical reason. It represents the transaction variable explained 
in Chapter 3. There are several reasons for using a specific private consumption variable 
instead of GDP or a more general consumption variable. First of all, it is clear that in a 
modern developed economy, such as Norway, cash is not used for all transactions. Typically 
cash is only used in so-called point-of-sale (POS) transactions. Further it is likely that private 
households are the main demander of cash. We wish to construct a variable that captures the 
transaction motive of holding cash. It is therefore believed that a “narrow” private-
consumption-variable, which only consists of private point-of-sale (POS) transactions, is the 
most appropriate variable to capture this effect. A detailed explanation of how this 
consumption variable is constructed is given in Appendix II. We would expect a positive 
effect on the cash holdings of this consumption variable. Again, in order to capture the real 
cash holdings, this POS-consumption variable is deflated. However, this variable is not 
deflated by the general consumer price index. Instead it is deflated by a specific price index, 
which only includes prices of the consumption goods included in the POS variable.TP44 PT An 
explanation of how this consumer price index is constructed is given in Appendix II. 
 
5.2.2 Financial innovation variables 
It is often argued that advances in payments technology have resulted in a substitution of non-
cash payments for cash, see for instance Snellman, Vesela and Humphrey (2000). There are 
different ways to capture such financial innovation effects. Some authors argue that this effect 
will be captured by including a linear trend in the regressions, see for example Fischer, Köhler 
and Seitz (2004). Others use more direct measures of financial innovations, such as the 
                                                 
TP
43
PT It includes commissions on utilised NOK loans excl. non-accrual loans to non-financial enterprises, 
households and local government at end of quarter.  
TP
44
PT This specific consumer price index is constructed by my supervisor Terje Skjerpen. 
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numbers of ATM’s, bankcards or EFTPOS terminals, see for example Drehmann and 
Goodhart (2000). Especially in a structural analysis of cash demand, these figures are 
informative, but as argued in Fischer, Köhler and Seitz (2004) for an econometric analysis 
they have the disadvantage to only be available on an annual basis. In other words, there is 
lack of quarterly information on these variables. Another aspect is that the innovation process 
has been so rapid, that it can be argued that it is difficult to distinguish the effect of the 
different variables. For example cheque was a substitute for cash until the end of the 1980s 
but, as seen in Chapter 2, the use of cheques can now more or less be ignored. Some of the 
variables are also believed to be highly correlated, in other words multicollinearity may be a 
problem.  
   
However, keeping in mind the aspects above, together with the fact that a general-to-specific 
methodology is used, makes me consider three financial innovation variables in addition to a 
linear time trend. I will consider, as Drehmann and Goodhart (2000) did, the number of 
ATMs and EFTPOS terminals as regressors. In addition to these two variables, I will also 
consider a self-constructed variable. This is the price of using alternative payment instruments 
to cash. The three variables are described below.   
 
(i) The number of ATMs 
It can be argued that the effect of ATMs on cash demand may be ambiguous. On the one 
hand, ATMs should decrease the transaction costs of money holdings. That is, the cost of 
acquiring cash is now lower, and according to the Baumol-Tobin theory of transaction 
demand for money, this implies a decrease in money holdings. On the other hand, more 
ATMs imply that cash is more available. In other words, cash is a more suitable substitute for 
non-cash payments. This has a positive effect on the demand of cash. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the effects of ATMs may be ambiguous. 
 
(ii) The number of EFTPOS terminals 
Again, the effect of EFTPOS terminals on cash demand may be argued to be ambiguous. 
However, it may be argued that it is only ambiguous over a part of the sample. First, more 
EFTPOS terminals imply that it is easier to make point-of-sale payments using payment 
cards. Obviously this has a negative effect on the demand for cash. But on the other side, due 
to the introduction of cash back in connection with good purchases, it can be argued that 
EFTPOS terminals also may have a positive effect on cash demand. Cash back makes cash 
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more available. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, cash back was first introduced at the 
end of 1992.  
 
Further, there is lack of quarterly information for the variables of the number of ATMs and 
EFTPOS terminals. First of all, only annual data are available. This means that I had to 
convert the annual data series to quarterly series. I have been in contact with BBS, TP 45 PT and they 
have confirmed that there exists no systematic seasonal pattern for the placement of ATMs 
and EFTPOS terminals. I have therefore made an assumption of equal changes within the 
calendar year. In other words I have applied a so-called linear interpolation.TP46 PT In addition to 
this, there is lack of information on the annual data series. The observations for 1980 and 
1981 in the annual data series for ATMs are based on backward estimations from a previous 
study by Gresvik and Kaloudis (2001) in Norges Bank. The same is the case for the 
observations from 1982-1986 in the annual data series for EFTPOS terminals. 
 
(iii) Price on the use of alternative payment instruments 
When making a point-of-sale payment in for example a grocery store, one has two relevant 
alternatives. One can pay by using cash or by using card.TP47 PT But if you choose to pay with card, 
the bank charges a fee. How large the fee is, depends on which private bank the cardholder 
use. But usually it is around 2 NOK. It might therefore be relevant to consider whether such 
prices have an effect on the use of cash. I have therefore tried to construct such a price 
variable. Both card and cheque are substitutes to cash, but the use of these two alternatives 
have changed significantly over the estimation period. The costs of using these two 
alternatives are also different. I have therefore constructed the following weighted real price 
variable: 
 
( ) ( )
CPICTT
TPTP
P
chequecard
chequechequebankcardcard
alt
1
+
×+×
=  . 
 
Here PBcardB is the average price of a transaction when using bankcard as a payment instrument, 
and TBbankcardB denotes the total number of bankcard transactions. The cheque-variable is defined 
                                                 
TP
45
PT BBS = Bankenes Betalingssentral AS, that is the banks payment and clearing house. 
TP
46
PT This means that if the change in a variable from one year to the next is 100, the change from the previous 
quarter is 25. 
TP
47
PT Cheque is usually no longer a relevant alternative to cash in point-of-sale transactions. However, it was an 
obvious alternative to cash in the 1980s.  
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in a similar way. Further in the denominator TBcard B denotes the total number of all card 
transactions, and CPIC denotes the POS consumption price index. TP48 PT A problem with this price 
variable is that there is some lack of information for the different components of the variable. 
First, the number of transactions using card and cheques is only available on an annual basis. 
However, BBS has monthly data available for card transactions for the years 2000-2003. In 
the construction of the price variable, I have therefore assumed that the transaction variables 
(for both card and cheque) follow the same seasonal pattern as in these three years. Second, 
there is some lack of information about the prices of use of cheque and cards in the 1980s. 
Therefore some of the numbers for these prices are estimates. A more detailed explanation of 
this is given in Appendix III. Intuitively, this variable should have a positive effect on cash 
holdings. The more expensive it is to use alternative payment instruments in a transaction, the 
more will individuals prefer to use cash.  
 
5.2.3 Illegal economy variables 
Tanzi (1982) argued that the high amount of cash outstanding could be due to the demand for 
cash in the underground economy. It is now commonly known that the illegal economy has a 
substantial impact on cash demand. It is likely that the majority of the payments in the illegal 
economy are settled with cash. This would mean that the development of the size of the 
shadow economy over time should be considered as determinants for cash holdings, see 
Dotsey (1988).  
 
(i) The share of tax and pensions to GDP 
In order to capture the effect of the illegal economy, I have included the share of taxes and 
pensions in GDP as a potential determinant of currency demand. This ratio should have a 
positive effect on money holdings. Tanzi (1982) argues that the reason for this is that citizens 
try to evade taxes by shifting part of their economic activity to the illegal economy, where 
paying with cash is the common practice. Rogoff (1998) confirms this result and develops a 
theoretical model of currency demand, where a marginal tax rate is included. The model 
presented in Chapter 3 is based on the model presented in Rogoff (1998). 
 
                                                 
TP
48
PT It is important to distinguish between TBbankcard Band TBcard B. The reason for this is that there exist several types of 
payment cards, and they are all substitutes to cash, but it is only prices connected to the use of bankcards (the 
others are free to use). For a more detailed explanation of these variables, see Appendix III. 
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There may also be other variables included, that can capture the effect of the shadow 
economy on cash holdings. For example Drehmann and Goodhart (2000) include crime 
variables. However, I have not included such variables in my analysis. This is due to the fact 
that it is not evident how one should measure such variables and the fact that there exists no 
quarterly information. Further Rogoff (1998) also argues that the influence of crime on cash 
holdings is ambiguous. He argues that criminals will probably use cash intensively, but on the 
other hand the threat of mugging will deter cash holdings among law-abiding individuals.  
 
5.3 Econometric analysis of cash demand 
In this section, I will present the empirical results of modelling total real cash demand in 
Norway. As mentioned above, seasonally unadjusted data for the period 1980.1 – 2004.2 are 
used. The estimation period is 1980.1 – 2001.4. The rest of the sample is then used for ex post 
forecasting purposes, which may be considered as a model selection criterion. Since some of 
the series show seasonal fluctuation, such as consumption and cash demand, three centred 
dummies are included in the model specification. These are labelled SB1t B, SB2t B and SB3t B, where SBitB 
is related to quarter i. Centred seasonal dummies behave as normal seasonal dummies, except 
that they add up to zero over the calendar year. This means that SBitB has value 0.75 in quarter i 
and -0.25 in the remaining three quarters. The reason that centred seasonal dummies are used 
is that they do not affect the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic used to test for 
cointegration. The variable to be modelled is demand for currency in circulation (cash). The 
variables are specified above. I will denote them as: real currency holdings (cu), real 
consumption (c), real interest rate (r), number of ATMs (atm), number of EFTPOS terminals 
(eftpos), price of using alternative payment instruments (pBaltB) and finally the share of tax and 
pensions to GDP ((t+p)/y). Further, all variables are in logarithms, except the interest rate and 
the ratio of tax and pension to GDP, which are untransformed. A graphic illustration of the 
data series are given in Figure 12 below. 
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Figure 12: Time series plots of the variables 
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The first step in the empirical analysis, involves performing stationarity tests, which in my 
case consists of running ADF tests. As explained in Section 4.3, we want to specify a model 
which consists of only stationary variables on each side of the equation.TP49 PT ADF tests are 
therefore performed in order to detect which transformations of the variables that are needed 
in order to obtain a balanced equation. The results of these tests are presented in Table 1 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
49
PT If the variables in levels are I(1), an equation in stationary variables involves differences of the variables plus a 
possible linear combination of the variables in levels that are stationary.  
  52
Table 1: Unit root tests (ADF-test) 
Variable Test specification Lag-length t-value 
cu 
c 
r 
atm 
eftpos 
(t+p)/y 
pBaltB 
∆cu 
∆c 
∆r 
∆atm 
∆eftpos 
∆(t+p)/y 
∆pBaltB 
T 
T 
C 
T 
T 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
4 
5 
2 
5 
0 
2 
4 
3 
4 
1 
4 
0 
1 
3 
-2.294 
-3.315 
-1.672 
-2.129 
-4.947** 
-2.106 
-1.542 
-3.595** 
-2.739 
-5.452** 
-1.773 
-7.374** 
-11.09** 
-3.605** 
Notes: C = constant, T =trend + constant. All specifications include centred seasonal dummies.  
If constant is included (C): 5% critical value = -2.90.  1% critical value = -3.51. 
If trend + constant is included (T): 5% critical value = -3.46.  1% critical value = -4.07.  
The critical values are those used by PcGive. 
Significant outcomes at a 1 per cent level are indicated by **. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, most of the variables appear to be I(1), at least at a 5 % 
significance level. This means that the variables will be transformed into first differences in 
the analysis.TP50 PT But as can be seen from Table 1, there are some exceptions. It may be claimed 
that real consumption (c) is not I(1). However it is very close to be considered as an I(1) 
variable at the 5 % significance level. In fact if I apply the ADF-test to the whole sample, 
which is 1980.1 - 2004.2, the hypothesis that real consumption is an I(1) variable can not be 
rejected. I will therefore treat real consumption (c) as an I(1) variable in the following 
analysis. Further the number of EFTPOS terminals (eftpos) can be considered as trend 
stationary. However, I will treat this variable as I(1) . It can also be seen that the number of 
ATMs is neither I(0) nor I(1). This may be problematic, but I will argue empirically that there 
are reasons for excluding this variable from the analysis. 
 
The next step is then to specify a model. My initial intention was to use a VAR approach. I 
started out by first specifying a broad VAR model. The model included all the variables 
                                                 
TP
50
PT It is important to notice that the equilibrium correction model contains both variables in levels and in first 
differences. This was explained in Chapter 4. 
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described above, where I considered (t+p)/y, atm, eftpos and pBaltB as exogenous variables. A 
trend, constant and centred seasonal dummies were also included in the model specification. 
Since quarterly unadjusted data were used, one had to expect that at least a VAR model of 
order 4 needed to be specified, in order to rule out problems with autocorrelation. In fact in 
my case even a VAR model of order 4 was insufficient, for this purpose. As pointed out by 
Sims (1980) (see Chapter 4), this obviously give rise to problems with too few degrees of 
freedom. In fact, when only having around 90 observations, very few variables can be 
included in a VAR specification. I therefore specified a narrower model, considering only real 
cash, consumption and real interest rate in addition to a linear trend, centred seasonal 
dummies and a constant, as variables. But even this model, resulted in problems with lack of 
degrees of freedom, since at least a VAR model of order 6 was needed in order to get rid of 
autocorrelation in the residuals.TP51 PT Since this paper only focuses on cash demand and the fact 
that a VAR approach seems inappropriate to use, I have chosen to focus on a single-equation 
approach. This approach was explained in detail in Chapter 4.   
 
As explained in Chapter 4, a general-to-specific methodology is used. A problem here is to 
decide how many lags of the different variables to include in the general model specification. 
I have chosen to look at two different general models. In both model specifications I have 
chosen to include 4 lags of the consumption and interest rate variables, 1 lag of all the other 
explanatory variables, centred seasonal dummies, linear trend and a constant.TP52 PT In addition to 
these terms an equilibrium correction term is included. What differs in the two specifications 
is that in the first specification 4 lags of the dependent variable (cash) were included, and in 
the second specification 8 lags were included. Further, checking the correlation matrix 
between the regressors, it turns out that the numbers of ATMs and the numbers of EFTPOS-
terminals are highly correlated.TP53 PT Due to possible problems with multicollinearity, I will 
therefore specify models where only one of these variables is included as a regressor. In fact 
one may argue that it is better to include eftpos as a regressor than atm. A reason for this is 
that atm can not be considered as I(1), which means that including atm as a regressor yields 
an unbalanced equation. But for the time being I will consider both. 
 
                                                 
TP
51
PT In fact, it is not even clear if a VAR model of order 6 gets rid of the problem with autocorrelation. The AR 1-5 
test (explained in Chapter 4) had a p-value of 0.0946. 
TP
52
PT The linear trend has value 1,2,3,... with value 1 occurring for the first observation, 1980.1. 
TP
53
PT The level variables have a correlation coefficient of 0.94. 
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Further, the variable pBaltB gives a contra-intuitive effect on the demand for cash. That is, it 
seems to have a negative effect on cash demand. In Section 5.1.2 I argued that there is data 
problems involved in the construction of this variable. Bearing these things in mind, I have 
therefore disregarded the effect of this variable on the demand for cash. TP54 PT    
 
The discussion above, suggests four variants of the two different model specifications. That is 
two different variants of the two different model specifications. The difference between the 
two variants is whether atm or eftpos is used as regressors in the general model specification. 
The next step will then be to eliminate statistically insignificant variables by standard testing 
procedure. Usually when starting out with a general model, there are more than one 
statistically insignificant variable. When applying the procedure, I have consequently 
eliminated the variable with the highest p-value. After a variable is eliminated, one then has to 
estimate the resulting model. The procedure is then applied again, that is the variable with the 
highest p-value is eliminated and the model is re-estimated. This procedure is continued until 
the model contains only significant variables. If all these t-tests were independent, a sequence 
of n single tests would each have had a significance level of α/n, such that the total level 
would have been α. However, since these t-tests are not independent, this would not be the 
right significance level to use. In fact, it is not possible to calculate an exact significance level 
of such a sequence of t-tests, when the tests are not independent. There are different 
approaches of how to deal with this problem. One suggestion is to use a low significance level 
for the individual t-tests. In my case, I have chosen a significance level of 2 per cent in the 
specific t-tests.  
 
When applying this elimination procedure it turns out that neither atm nor eftpos are 
significant variables in the maintained models. It also turns out that whichever of these 
variables one chooses in the general specification, it has no impact on the final model when 
the general-to-specific procedure is used. I have therefore the following two candidates as the 
maintained model for the demand of cash (with t-values in parentheses): 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
54
PT However, I will strongly recommend a closer look on the effect of this variable in future applications.    
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Model 1: (Effective sample: 1981.2-2001.4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )06.225.228.316.340.2
ˆ0416.00493.00671.00757.00717.0
33.410.334.539.386.3
0101.03191.04990.00107.00113.0
48.399.234.638.314.2
3629.03445.05333.00025.0886.1
1,4.1997,4.1993321
1112
34
−−−
+++−−−
−−−
−+−∆+∆−
−
∆+∆+∆+−=∆
−−−−
−−
tttttt
ttttt
ttttt
DDSSS
rccurr
cccutrendcu
ε
. 
 
This can also be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )06.225.228.316.340.2
ˆ0416.00493.00671.00757.00717.0
48.213.234.539.386.3
0202.06395.04990.00107.00113.0
48.399.234.638.314.2
3629.03445.05333.00025.0886.1
1,4.1997,4.1993321
1112
34
−−−
+++−−−
−−−
+−−∆+∆−
−
∆+∆+∆+−=∆
−−−−
−−
tttttt
ttttt
ttttt
DDSSS
rccurr
cccutrendcu
ε
. 
 
Here t1εˆ denotes the residual from the OLS estimation. The t-values of the long-run 
coefficients are calculated by applying the delta-method, see Kmenta (1997, p. 486). A 
detailed explanation of the calculations is given in Appendix IV. Further, it can be seen from 
the equations above that the seasonal effects are almost identical. In other words, the model 
suggests that it is only the fourth quarter that has a different seasonal pattern for the demand 
for cash.   
 
Model 2: (Effective sample: 1982.2-2001.4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )17.264.246.433.493.5
ˆ0440.00520.00101.03228.05163.0
41.370.393.205.448.492.2
0107.02291.02894.03435.00029.003.2
2,4.1997,3.1993111
84
−−−
++−−+−
−−
∆−∆+∆+∆+−=∆
−−−
−−
tttttt
tttttt
DDrccu
rccucutrendcu
ε
. 
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This can also be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )17.264.266.271.293.5
ˆ0440.00520.00196.06252.05163.0
41.370.393.205.448.492.2
0107.02291.02894.03435.00029.003.2
2,4.1997,3.1993111
84
−−−
++−+−−
−−
∆−∆+∆+∆+−=∆
−−−
−−
tttttt
tttttt
DDrccu
rccucutrendcu
ε
. 
 
Again, the t-values for the long-run coefficients are calculated by applying the formula in 
Kmenta (1997, p. 486). It is here worth mentioning that in this model, there are no significant 
seasonal effects. 
 
Some general diagnostics and tests for the two models are presented in tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2:  Empirical measures and diagnostic tests (effective sample: 1981.2/1982.2-2001.4) 
 
    
     
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Sigma represents the estimated standard error of the regression. RSS denotes residual sum of squares.   
RP2 P-adj represents RP2P relative to difference and season, see Hendry and Doornik (1996, p. 239). 
 
Table 3: Residual misspecification tests (effective sample: 1981.2/1982.2-2001.4) 
 
Statistics 
   (p-value) 
AR 1-5 
     F(5,65) 
ARCH 1-4 
   F(4,62) 
Norm 
       χP2 P(2) 
Hetero 
    F(21,48) 
RESET 
     F(1,69) 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
0.13075 
[0.9848] 
0.48059 
[0.7894]   
0.53182 
[0.7128]   
0.81425 
[0.5211]   
1.7047 
[0.4264]   
3.4816 
[0.1754]   
0.75998 
0.7576]   
0.82250 
[0.6661]   
0.26472 
[0.6086]   
1.6771 
[0.1998]   
Notes: P-values are given in parentheses. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Sigma 
RSS 
RP2 P 
RP2 P-adj 
DW 
Mean(∆cuBt B) 
Var(∆cuBt B) 
0.018 
0.023 
0.892 
0.884 
2.00 
0.000053 
0.002559 
0.019 
0.024 
0.885 
0.877 
1.93 
0.000754 
0.002625 
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Table 3 presents residual misspecification tests for the two models. The interpretation of the 
tests was explained in the previous chapter. Obviously the two non-nested models seem to 
give statistically acceptable results. The models seem to be free of autocorrelation and 
ARCH-effects. We can not reject the null-hypothesis of normality, nor do we find any 
evidence of mis-specified functional form (RESET-test).   
 
I will now take a closer look at the two models. Both models have only consumption and real 
interest rate as regressors in addition to a constant, a linear trend and lagged variables of the 
dependent variable. The linear trend is significant in both models. As explained in Section 
5.1.2 one can argue that this linear trend captures the effect of financial innovations on the 
demand for cash. The fact that the coefficient in front of the trend is negative in both models 
strengthens this argument. On the other hand, the seasonal dummies are only significant in 
Model 1. In Model 1 a third lag of relative change in consumption and a second lag of change 
in the real interest rate are significant regressors. These are not significant in Model 2, but lag 
8 of the dependent variable (change in cash) is present in Model 2. Two impulse dummies are 
included in both models. In both models, some large residuals are present in the two last 
quarters of 1993 and the first quarter of 1994. This is the reason for including the dummies in 
1993.3 (Model 2) and 1993.4 (Model 1). These large residuals may be associated with the 
introduction of cash back. Cash back was, as mentioned above, introduced in 1992, but it is 
likely that noticeable effects first appeared in 1993. However an event that is more likely to 
have had a significant impact on the cash holdings, is the change in the monetary policy in 
December 1992. After massive pressure on the Norwegian currency (NOK), Norges Bank 
changed their monetary policy from a fixed rate, to a float regime. Obviously this had an 
impact on the Norwegian economy in the periods after, which can clearly be seen from the 
massive fall in the real interest rate within the year 1993. Although interest rate is already 
included in the model, it can be argued that these changes have had a significant impact on 
other parts of the economy that are not modelled. These may in turn have influenced the 
demand for cash. Introducing a dummy for 1997.4 can be defended since 1997 was a year 
when the use of payment cards increased very rapidly. It is then likely that this effect is 
particular strong in the 4Pth P quarter, due to seasonal effects for transactions.    
 
Both models are so-called equilibrium correction models. These models make it convenient to 
study both short- and long-run effects. It can be seen from the two models that the short-run 
(immediate) effects of changes in consumption and interest rate differ slightly. The short-run 
  58
transaction elasticity is 0.34 in Model 1, but only 0.23 in Model 2. We can interpret this as the 
immediate demand for cash increases by 0.34 (Model 1) or 0.23 (Model 2) per cent when 
consumption increases by one per cent ceteris paribus. Further, the short-run interest semi-
elasticity in the two models is approximately 0.01 in both models. In other words if the 
interest rate increases by one percentage point, the immediate effect on the demand for cash, 
is a decrease by 0.01 per cent. 
    
Furthermore, the two models are even more similar when it comes to the long-run effects. In 
fact the long-run coefficients of the two variables are almost identical, so is the parameter in 
front of the equilibrium term. The derived cointegration relationships are for Model 1: cuBt B = 
0.6395 c Bt B – 0.0202 r Bt B, and for Model 2: cuBt B = 0.6252 c Bt B – 0.0196 r Bt B. As we can see, both 
models have long-run transaction elasticity (consumption coefficient) of approximately 0.63. 
We can interpret this as the long-run cash demand increases by 0.63 percent if consumption 
increases by one per cent ceteris paribus. The long-run interest rate semi-elasticity is 
approximately 0.02 in both models. That is if the interest rate increases by one percentage 
point ceteris paribus, then the long-run cash demand decreases by 0.02 per cent. 
 
It is of substantial interest to compare these results with the results reported by Fischer, 
Köhler and Seitz (2004). They have investigated the demand for real cash in the euro area 
using a cointegration approach. Their derived cointegration relationship is: cuBt B = -8.06 + 1.05 
c Bt B – 0.04 r3Bt B + 0.41e Bt B. Here c denotes real private expenditure, r3 denotes the three-month 
money market rate and e denotes the real effective exchange rate of the euro. In their analysis 
both consumption and interest rate have stronger long-run effects on the demand for cash than 
obtained in this thesis. 
 
A possible explanation for this may be that Norway has a more developed payment system 
than the Euro area as a whole. One would therefore expect that the relative use of cash is less 
in Norway than in the Euro area. On the other side this does not necessarily mean that 
consumption and interest rate have less marginal effect on the demand for cash. However, one 
should be careful when interpreting the differences in these results, since they must be viewed 
in the light of the fact that Fischer, Köhler and Seitz (2004) use a broader consumption 
variable and a different interest rate variable than I have applied. 
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Furthermore the highly significant equilibrium correction term (t-value of respectively -5.34 
and -5.93) in the two models, gives the impression that an equilibrium correction model is 
appropriate. In fact comparing the t-values with the non-standard critical values provided by 
Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre (1998) strengthens this assertion. TP55 PT However, this test relies on 
the assumption that the regressors are weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters in the 
real cash demand equation. Results from the weak exogeneity tests, as outlined in Boswijk 
and Urbain (1997) (and explained in Chapter 4), are given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Tests for weak exogeneity (p-values in parentheses) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
LM B1 B 
χ P2P (2) 
 3.6375 
 [0.1622] 
 0.38841 
 [0.8235] 
LM B2 B 
χ P2P (2) 
 0.4334 
 [0.8052] 
 2.1842 
 [0.3355]   
LM=LM B1 B+LM B2 
χ P2P(4) 
 4.0709 
[0.3965] 
 2.5726 
[0.6317] 
Notes: LMB1 B represents the test statistic when testing for weak exogeneity for the short run parameters. LMB2B 
represents the test statistic when testing for weak exogeneity for the long run parameters. Finally LM represents 
the joint test statistic. Critical values for the joint test: 5 % critical: 9.49, 1 % critical: 13.28.   
 
Table 4 shows that for both models consumption and interest rate are clearly weakly 
exogenous for the parameters in the structural equation for cash. In light of the tests for weak 
exogeneity and under the assumption of only one cointegrating relation, one can defend 
estimating the structural equation with OLS. 
 
The next step will be to check the parameter stability in the two competing models. Sequences 
of the Chow tests as outlined in Chapter 4 (scaled by their 1 % critical values) and recursive 
estimates (with ± 2 standard errors) are displayed in the figures below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
55
PT When a constant and trend is included and the number of regressors is 2, the 1% critical value is -4.60 and the 
5 % critical value is -3.98 for a sample size of 100 observations. One should notice that the sample I have used 
contains less than 100 observations (that is around 80 observations).  
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Figure 13: Recursive test statistics for Model 1 
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Figure 14: Recursive test statistics for Model 2 
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From figures 13 and 14, one can conclude that the structural equation shows no sign of being 
mis-specified. 
 
Further, it is of interest to check the recursive estimates of the parameters in the two 
competing models. 
 
Figure 15: Recursive estimates of parameters in Model 1 ± SE 
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0
1
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1990 2000
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Figure 16: Recursive estimates of parameters in Model 2 ± SE 
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As can be seen from the figures above, both the long- and short-run parameters of the models 
seem to be reasonably invariant over time. Especially this holds for Model 2, which seems to 
have slightly more stable parameters than Model 1. 
 
A final step in the modelling selection procedure will be to check the forecasting properties of 
the models within the sample (ex post forecast properties). Information on this is presented in 
Table 5 and the graphs below. I have here used the derived ex post forecasts for the two 
competing models for the period 2002.1-2004.2. In the figures also the 5 per cent forecast 
error bands are provided. 
 
Table 5: Summary measures for ex post forecast errors 
 Model 1 Model 2 
RMSE 
MAPE 
0.0509 
102.94 
0.0491 
127.41 
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Figure 17: Actual and fitted values and ex post (in-sample) forecasting outcomes for Model 1 
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Figure 18: Actual and fitted values and ex post (in-sample) forecasting outcomes for Model 2 
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  64
It can clearly be seen from figures 17 and 18 above, that both models have some problems 
when it comes to forecasting the demand for real cash. Both models seem to over-predict the 
true cash demand process. This may be problematic when using the model for ex ante 
forecasting. It should be noted that some of the forecasts are outside the 5 per cent forecast 
error bands. Especially the models have difficulties in forecasting the demand for real cash in 
2003. On the other hand, it can be argued that this is a turbulent period for the Norwegian 
economy. In March 2001, Norges Bank changed their monetary policy to an inflation 
targeting regime. Obviously this had effects on the Norwegian economy. It is believed that the 
market needed some time to adjust to the new policy regime. Especially the interest rate 
changed in this period. The years 2001 and 2002 were characterized by a high interest rate. 
The interest rate then started to fall rapidly in the late 2002 and the decrease continued 
through the year 2003. Thereafter it seems that the interest rate has been stabilized. However, 
these changes in the interest rate are taken into account by the models. On the other hand, the 
models do not capture the fact that these interest rate changes may have affected other non-
modelled aspects of the economy. In other words, effects on variables omitted from the 
structural equation, but which in turn may have an influence on the demand for real cash.  
 
This may therefore be an explanation for the poor forecasting results of the models. I tried to 
estimate the two models over the shorter sample 1980.1-1999.4, and made forecasts for 
2000.1-2001.4. In this case the results where quite good. Further I have estimated the model 
over the whole sample period (1980.1 – 2004.2) (see next chapter). If I then include an 
impulse dummy 2003.1, the estimation results seem to be reasonably good. 
 
In summary, both Model 1 and Model 2 seem to give satisfying results when estimating the 
demand for real cash. One may claim that they both seem to be congruent models for the 
demand for real cash. However, only one of them can represent the “true” data generating 
process. The models are quite similar, and give similar results. This makes it difficult to 
differentiate between which of the two models that gives the best representation of the “true” 
data generating process of the demand for cash. As a final step in the model selection 
procedure, I tried to apply different encompassing tests (see Section 4.2), in order to 
investigate whether one of the models encompassed the other. However these tests gave no 
clear answer to which model to choose. I will therefore continue to consider both models in 
the following chapter.  
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6. Forecasting the demand for cash in Norway 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will present some ex ante forecasts for the demand for cash in Norway. For 
this purpose I have considered three models. The first two models are the ones explained in 
the previous chapter. In addition to these a simple autoregressive time series model is 
considered. This last model can be regarded as a benchmark model.   
 
6.2 Models 
In the previous chapter, Model 1 and Model 2 were estimated using the sample 1980.1-
2001.4. In this way one could retain some observations for ex post forecasts. As argued, this 
was a step in the model selection procedure. However, now the interest is not on model 
selection, but on how the selected model(s) performs when it comes to forecasting the demand 
for cash. In order to produce ex ante forecasts, it is therefore suggested to re-estimate the 
selected model(s) using all available data. Ideally the estimated coefficients based on the 
estimations using the whole sample and the sub-sample (1980.1-2001.4) should not differ too 
much. The results from estimating Model 1 and Model 2 using the sample 1980.1-2004.2 are 
given below (with t-values in parentheses). Results from the diagnostic tests and the residual 
misspecification tests are given in Appendix V.      
 
Model 1: (Effective sample 1981.2-2004.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )80.278.290.245.334.327.2
ˆ0587.00566.00618.00720.00787.00678.0
94.302.266.544.349.2
0067.01750.03539.00083.00060.0
37.350.227.840.210.2
3501.02854.05852.00015.0903.1
1,1.2003,4.1997,4.1993321
1112
34
−−−−
+−++−−−
−−−
−+−∆+∆−
−
∆+∆+∆+−=∆
−−−−
−−
ttttttt
ttttt
ttttt
DDDSSS
rccurr
cccutrendcu
ε
. 
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Model 2: (Effective sample 1982.2-2004.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )77.183.204.262.320.361.5
ˆ0385.00588.00415.00065.01990.03490.0
27.244.208.454.451.338.2
0058.01383.03804.03780.00017.059.1
2,1.2003,4.1997,3.1993111
84
−−−−
+−+−−+−
−−
∆−∆+∆+∆+−=∆
−−−
−−
ttttttt
tttttt
DDDrccu
rccucutrendcu
ε
. 
 
If one compares the estimation results for these two models, with the estimation results in 
Chapter 5 (when using the sub-sample period 1980.1-2001-4), it can be seen that the results 
are quite similar. However, some differences occur. A reason for this may be that an impulse 
dummy for 2003.1 is included in both models, when the estimation period was extended to 
cover the whole sample. The reason for including such a dummy is that 2003.1 was a quarter 
with unusually high inflation, stemming from the unusually high electricity prices that winter. 
As can be seen from the estimation results above, this impulse dummy is more significant in 
Model 1 than in Model 2. The reason for not excluding the impulse dummy in Model 2 
(which is not very significant), is that the model then seems to get some problems with 
parameter stability (Chow tests).   
 
In addition to these two models, a simple AR(8) model in ∆cuBt B is estimated. Insignificant lags 
are excluded by applying the same procedure as for Model 1 and Model 2 in Chapter 5. The 
resulting model is denoted as Model 3. The reason for including such a model in the 
forecasting analysis is that such simple univariate models have a tendency to outperform more 
sophisticated models, when it comes to forecasting properties. This model may therefore be 
considered as a benchmark model, and it is of great interest to compare the forecasts produced 
by Model 1 and Model 2 with the forecasts obtained by this simple model. The results from 
estimating Model 3 using the sample 1980.1-2004.2 is given below (with t-values in 
parentheses). Diagnostic tests and residual misspecification tests related to this model are 
given in Appendix V. 
 
Model 3: (Effective sample 1981.2-2004.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )70.306.340.422.213.307.0
ˆ3734.02251.04231.01572.02251.00002.0 387421
−−−
+∆+∆−∆+∆−∆−=∆
−−−−− ttttttt cucucucucucu ε . 
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It is not convenient to produce ex ante forecasts for equilibrium correction models in PcGive. 
However, it is always possible to transform the equilibrium correction model to a model in 
levels. This is therefore done for the two equilibrium correction models, but also for the 
simple univariate model. The models in level form are given as:  
 
Model 1: 
tttttt
ttttttt
ttttttt
DDDSS
Srrrrcc
cccucucutrendcu
1,1.2003,4.1997,4.199332
132143
1541
ˆ0587.00566.00618.00720.00787.0
0678.00083.00083.00007.00060.03501.03501.0
1104.02854.05852.05852.06461.00015.0903.1
ε+−++−−
−−+−−−+
−+−++−=
−−−−−
−−−−
, 
 
Model 2: 
tt
tttttt
ttttttt
D
DDrrcc
cucucucucutrendcu
2,1.2003
,4.1997,3.199311
98541
ˆ0385.0
0588.00415.00007.00058.00607.01383.0
3804.03804.03780.03780.06510.00017.059.1
ε+−
+−−−−+
−+−++−=
−−
−−−−−
and  
 
Model 3: 
ttt
ttttttt
cucu
cucucucucucucu
398
754321
ˆ3734.01483.0
2251.04231.04231.01572.00679.0077490002.0
ε+−+
−−+−++=
−−
−−−−−− . 
 
It is important to notice that what is done here is a pure transformation. This means that the 
two different representations of the models are identical. When applying this transformation 
one therefore has to impose some parameter restrictions, which ensure that the transformed 
models are equal the untransformed models. A problem is that it seems like PcGive is not able 
to re-estimate the transformed models with the imposed parameter restrictions. This is 
problematic, since we want to make ex ante forecasts using the exact models selected from 
the model selection criteria. To avoid this problem, the forecasts have been produced using 
another software program, namely TSP 4.5 (see Hall and Cummins (1999)). 
 
6.3 Forecasts 
A general problem, when performing ex ante forecasts using a single equation model where 
exogenous variables are present, is that one needs to make some assumptions of how these 
exogenous variables will evolve in the future. This problem is present when obtaining 
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forecasts using Model 1 and Model 2. In order to obtain forecasts using Model 1 and Model 2, 
I have decided to base the evolution of the exogenous variables of interests, on forecasts 
produced by Statistics Norway and Norges Bank. These forecasts are given in Appendix VI. It 
is however important to be aware of that these forecasts are not exactly the same as the ones 
obtained by Statistics Norway and Norges Bank. I have here assumed that the price index for 
POS consumption follows the same evolution as the forecasts produced by Statistics Norway 
for the general Consumer price index. Furthermore POS consumption follows the same 
evolution as the forecasts obtained by Statistics Norway on private consumption, and the 
nominal banks deposit rate follows the same evolution as Norges Banks forecasts for the folio 
rate, published in Norges Bank (2004c).TP56 PT  
 
Further, it is now possible to produce forecasts for currency in circulation conditioning on the 
assumed evolution of the exogenous variables. I have chosen to perform h-step ahead 
forecasts up until 2007.4 for all three models. Further I have transformed the forecast values 
from logs back to levels by using the anti-log operator. The forecasts are presented in Table 6 
(forecasts without intercept correction). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
56
PT The forecast for the Consumer price index and POS consumption, are consistent with the calculations that are 
made in Statistics Norway (2004). However, one should notice that the forecasts published in Statistics Norway 
(2004) are on an annual basis. Further the consumption variable is different, since it covers consumption both by 
households and NPISHs.  
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Table 6: Ex ante forecasts for demand for real cash (in billions of 2001- NOK) 
Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
Intercept correction Forecast 
period No Yes No Yes No Yes 
2004.3 43.978 43.165 43.147 42.609 41.247 41.669 
2004.4 49.406 47.911 49.315 48.304 47.227 48.089 
2005.1 45.277 43.566 44.019 42.888 41.623 42.672 
2005.2 45.914 43.957 45.859 44.526 43.249 44.669 
2005.3 47.082 44.440 45.850 44.207 41.379 43.243 
2005.4 51.925 48.753 51.772 49.772 47.567 50.197 
2006.1 46.652 43.762 45.507 43.714 41.981 44.703 
2006.2 46.002 43.197 46.656 44.825 43.818 47.010 
2006.3 46.898 43.831 46.359 44.274 41.548 45.207 
2006.4 50.790 47.572 51.305 48.964 47.954 52.776 
2007.1 45.079 42.390 44.552 42.579 42.009 46.701 
2007.2 43.924 41.457 45.589 43.658 44.156 49.553 
2007.3 45.008 42.439 45.109 43.096 41.560 47.327 
2007.4 48.498 45.885 49.391 47.282 48.133 55.467 
 
 
Since Norges Bank issues banknotes and coins, it is also of interest to present the forecasts for 
the nominal cash demand. These are simply constructed by multiplying the forecasts for real 
cash demand by the forecasts for the POS price index.  
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Table 7: Ex ante forecasts for the nominal demand for cash (in billions of NOK) 
Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
Intercept correction Forecast 
period No Yes No Yes No Yes 
2004.3 44.843 44.014 43.995 43.447 42.058 42.488 
2004.4 50.624 49.092 50.531 49.495 48.391 49.275 
2005.1 46.486 44.730 45.195 44.033 42.735 43.812 
2005.2 47.346 45.328 47.289 45.914 44.597 46.063 
2005.3 48.486 45.766 47.218 45.525 42.613 44.533 
2005.4 54.061 50.758 53.901 51.819 49.524 52.262 
2006.1 48.726 45.708 47.531 45.658 43.847 46.691 
2006.2 48.328 45.380 49.014 47.091 46.033 49.387 
2006.3 49.294 46.070 48.727 46.535 43.671 47.516 
2006.4 54.041 50.616 54.589 52.097 51.023 56.153 
2007.1 48.174 45.300 47.610 45.502 44.893 49.907 
2007.2 47.298 44.642 49.091 47.011 47.547 53.359 
2007.3 48.539 45.769 48.649 46.477 44.820 51.040 
2007.4 52.919 50.068 53.893 51.592 52.521 60.523 
 
Unfortunately TSP is not able to calculate the uncertainty for these forecasts. Generally, there 
are four sources of forecast uncertainty for such single equation equilibrium correction 
models, used in this analysis. These are: 
 
(i) Error uncertainty. 
(ii) Estimation uncertainty. 
(iii) Uncertainty connected to the evolution of the exogenous variables (they are all 
unknown and need to be forecasted). 
(iv) Uncertainty connected to the fact that the postulated model does not coincide 
with the “true” data generating process. This may in turn also lead to prediction 
bias.  
 
If PcGive could have been used, the forecast uncertainty which would have been calculated, 
would only have taken the error uncertainty into account. This means, that the forecast 
uncertainty reported by PcGive is too small. The reason to this is that it neglects the three 
other uncertainty aspects denoted above.TP57 PT It can therefore be argued that the cost of 
performing the forecasts using the software program TSP is not of great importance. On the 
                                                 
TP
57
PT However, it is generally not clear, how one should deal with the uncertainty source (iv). 
  71
other side, it would have been ideal to be able to calculate the true uncertainty of the forecasts 
of the three models under the assumption that the model is correct. 
 
The forecasts above are ex ante forecasts. It is therefore at this stage not possible to compare 
the forecasts with the actual values. On the other side, it is of interest to compare the different 
forecasts produced by the three different models. As can clearly be seen from the forecast 
results above, the three models yield different forecasts. However, the forecasts produced by 
Model 1 and Model 2 are more similar than the ones obtained by Model 3. On the other side 
the two former models are also more similar, and one would therefore expect that the 
forecasts produced by these models are quite similar. It should also be noted that forecasts 
produced by Model 1 have a tendency to give a higher value of cash demand than Model 2, 
especially for the first two years. Further, forecasts produced by Model 3 suggest lower values 
of cash demand than both Model 1 and Model 2. As argued above, the reason for including 
Model 3 is that such univariate time series models have a tendency to outperform more 
sophisticated models, at least with respect to short-run forecasts. One would therefore like to 
get forecasts results from the two other models (Model 1 and Model 2) that do not differ too 
much from the forecast results obtained by Model 3. 
 
Further, it can be seen from Figure 17 and Figure 18 in Chapter 5 that when producing ex post 
forecasts for Model 1 and Model 2, they had a tendency to over-predict the actual values of 
currency in circulation. This, together with the fact that the forecast results from Model 1 and 
Model 2 differ considerably from the ones obtained by Model 3, may suggest that Model 1 
and Model 2 have a tendency to over-predict the demand for cash.  
 
6.4 Forecasts when applying intercept correction 
Intercept correction, is the so-called set the model “back on track” mechanism, which was 
explained in Section 4.9.5. Forecasts are produced applying intercept correction to the three 
models discussed above. This is a procedure which is often used by applied forecasters. The 
reason for this is that it is seen as a possible counter to structural breaks and parameter 
changes. The concept of intercept correction is thoroughly discussed in Clements and Hendry 
(1998, 1999). 
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The ex ante forecasts produced, are so-called h-step ahead forecasts. Intercept correction 
forecasts are made after setting the model “back on track” in 2004.2. This means that for each 
of the three models, the residual obtained in 2004.2 is added to the estimated intercept. In 
other words the fitted values for the demand for cash are identical in the three models, and 
they are also identical to the actual value of currency in circulation. Forecasts for the demand 
for cash are then produced by the three different models. The results are presented in tables 6 
and 7 above and in Figure 19 and Figure 20 below. 
 
Figure 19: Forecasts for real cash with intercept correction
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Figure 20: Forecasts for nominal cash with intercept correction
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It is now of interest to compare these forecasts. First, it can be seen that for the first 6 
quarters, the three models produce reasonable similar forecasts. In fact, Model 1 and Model 2 
give quite similar forecasts for the whole forecast period. On the other hand, forecasts 
produced by Model 3 differ much from the ones obtained by Model 1 and Model 2 for the last 
periods. However, it seems like the forecasts produced by Model 3 are “out of track”. This 
assertion is even strengthened, if one compares these forecasts with the forecast results 
without intercept correction. Further comparison shows that Model 1 and Model 2 seem to 
produce lower forecasts when intercept correction is applied. This might dampen the 
suspicion that these models over-predict the “true” demand for cash. 
 
6.5 Forecasts when using alternative forecasts for the exogenous variables 
The forecasts produced by Model 1 and Model 2 above are all forecasts that relies on a 
specific evolution of the exogenous variables. As explained above, I have chosen to rely on 
forecasts produced by Norges Bank and Statistics Norway, for the evolution of the exogenous 
variables. In the following I will denote these forecasts as “reference-forecasts”. Furthermore, 
it is of interest to investigate how the forecasts produced by the different models change, if the 
evolution of one of the exogenous variables changes. In this way, one can get an impression 
of how large the forecast uncertainty is, when basing the forecasts on specific evolution paths 
of the exogenous variables. I have therefore chosen to consider two specific alternative cases 
for the evolution of the exogenous variables. 
 
First, I will consider a case where consumption follows a different evolution path, than the 
forecasts produced by Statistics Norway. In this case I have assumed that the evolution of the 
consumption variable follows the same path as the forecasts produced by an AR(8)-process 
for consumption.TP58 PT The specific model is given in Appendix VI. All other exogenous variables 
are assumed to follow the same path as in the reference case. 
 
Second, I will consider a different evolution path for the real interest rate. In the reference 
forecasts, I have chosen to rely on forecasts for the nominal interest rate based on Norges 
Bank (2004c). Now, I will investigate how the different forecasts changes, when relying on 
some older forecasts for the nominal interest rate presented in Norges Bank (2003).TP59 PT Again, 
                                                 
TP
58
PT In the AR(8)-model for consumption, all insignificant variables are excluded.  
TP
59
PT In Norges Bank (2003) there are only forecasts for the interest rate until 2006.4. 
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all other exogenous variables are assumed to follow the same path as in the reference case. 
The forecasts for the interest rate presented in Norges Bank (2003) and (2004c) differ in the 
way that Norges Bank (2004c) assumes both a lower level of the interest rate and a slower 
increase in the interest rate over the specific forecasting period. Results from the forecasts 
obtained by the different assumptions of the exogenous variables are given in Appendix VII. 
The forecasts are produced both with and without intercept correction. 
 
Comparing the results, one can clearly see that the reference-forecasts and the forecasts 
obtained by the alternative consumption path, gives quite similar forecasts. On the other hand, 
forecasts obtained by the alternative interest rate path differ. They differ in the way that they 
give a lower demand for cash. This is also reasonable since the alterative interest rate path, 
suggests a higher interest rate than in the reference case. There may be different reasons 
explaining why the forecasts obtained when using an alternative interest rate path differ more 
from the reference-forecasts than the ones obtained when using an alternative consumption 
path. However, the main reason is probably that the alternative path for the interest rate differs 
more than the alternative path for consumption, compared to the interest and consumptions 
paths in the reference case. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that it is harder to 
forecast the interest rate than consumption. The reason for this is that consumption is likely to 
have minor fluctuations around a smooth trend while the interest rate is likely to be more 
volatile. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Despite major innovations in transactions technology, the demand for cash increased yearly 
until 1999, and has been reduced slowly since then. This paper has studied the determinants of 
cash demand in Norway during the period 1980-2004. A thorough discussion of the different 
determinants for cash demand has been carried through. As a starting point for the discussion, 
the concept of money and its role, the evolution of the payment system and theoretical models 
of money demand were considered. Since most of the theoretical models of money demand 
focus on a quite narrow concept of money, it is believed that some of these models are also 
relevant when investigating the demand for cash. Especially models considering private 
households demand for money are believed to be relevant. Based on this discussion, empirical 
models of demand for real cash have been developed. Rather than estimating the theoretical 
  75
models themselves, they are rather used to determine which explanatory variables that should 
be considered when an empirical model is specified.  
 
In the empirical analysis, quarterly data and a general-to-specific approach were used. Due to 
problems with autocorrelation in the residuals and lack of data, a VAR model was not deemed 
appropriate to use for estimating the demand for cash. Instead a single equation equilibrium 
correction model was used. Considering different initial models, eliminating insignificant 
variables and applying different statistical tests, suggest that there are two competitive, but 
also quite similar, models of relevance. Both models have only private point-of-sale 
consumption and real deposit interest rate as significant explanatory variables in addition to a 
linear trend, seasonal variables and impulse dummies. The rapid evolution in the payment 
system seems to have a negative effect on the demand for cash. This effect is represented in 
the models by a negative linear trend. 
 
The estimation results show that the two models short-run effects differ slightly, while the 
long-run effects are quite similar. The long-run elasticity for consumption was found to be 
approximately 0.63 and the semi-elasticity for the interest rate was found to be approximately 
0.02 in both models. These results differ compared to the results obtained by Fischer, Köhler 
and Seitz (2004) for the Euro area.  
 
The explanatory variables were found to be weakly exogenous with respect to all parameters 
in the structural equation for real cash, validating a single equation approach. In addition to 
this, the highly significant equilibrium correction term suggests that an equilibrium correction 
model is appropriate.  
 
In order to choose between one of the two competitive models, parameter stability and ex post 
forecasting properties were investigated. However, this did not lead us to a clear conclusion of 
which model to choose. Both models seem to have parameters that are reasonable stable. On 
the other side, both models have some problems when it comes to forecasting in the sample 
period 2002.1-2004.2. An explanation for this may be that this forecasting period was a rather 
turbulent period for the Norwegian economy. The main reason for this was probably that the 
economy needed some time to adjust to the change in the monetary policy regime in March 
2001. Since the model selection analysis, gave no clear suggestion of which model to choose, 
I treated both models on an equal basis.       
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For given evolution paths of the exogenous variables, ex ante forecasts for the period 2004.3-
2007.4 were obtained by the two models. In addition to this forecasts produced by a simple 
AR(8) model were also considered. The forecasts produced by the two competitive models 
that are developed, suggest that the demand for real cash will rise for the next couple of years, 
and then slowly decrease from the end of 2006. In contrast the simple AR(8) model suggests 
that the demand for cash will increase throughout the whole forecast period. In order to make 
the forecasts more robust for potential breaks, forecasts with intercept correction were also 
conducted. Finally, forecasts were obtained under alternative assumptions of the evolution 
paths for the exogenous variables.         
 
Finally, the work can be extended in different ways. First, it is believed that the illegal 
economy has a great impact on cash demand. An investigation of how large the illegal 
economy is and what determines the size of it, would be of interest in a further investigation 
of the demand for cash. Second, a further investigation of how consumers respond to the 
different prices related to alternative payment instruments would be of great interest. Finally, 
an investigation of the demand for different denominations of notes and coins would be of 
interest. Alternatively, this could be done by dividing the denominations into different groups, 
for example large, medium and small banknotes and coins. It is then likely that especially the 
demand for large banknotes is strongly affected by the illegal economy.         
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Appendices 
Appendix I. Data used in the empirical analysis 
 
Table I.1: Data, real values 
Period CU C r (t+p)/y ATM EFTPOS PBaltB 
1980.1 51722 63382 3.36 0.47 38 0 0.00 
1980.2 51376 66592 3.60 0.45 75 0 0.00 
1980.3 52615 70175 4.13 0.44 113 0 0.00 
1980.4 50975 76050 4.87 0.48 150 0 0.00 
1981.1 46751 60568 2.52 0.45 175 0 0.00 
1981.2 47234 65764 4.65 0.44 200 0 0.00 
1981.3 47582 68025 4.95 0.44 225 0 0.00 
1981.4 47415 74707 6.65 0.46 250 0 0.00 
1982.1 44243 60030 3.58 0.44 270 50 0.00 
1982.2 44769 65334 5.83 0.44 290 100 0.00 
1982.3 45693 67283 5.35 0.43 310 150 0.00 
1982.4 44353 71232 6.63 0.46 330 200 0.00 
1983.1 42569 61427 5.58 0.44 334 250 0.00 
1983.2 42927 64873 6.80 0.44 338 300 0.00 
1983.3 44125 68205 6.96 0.43 341 350 0.00 
1983.4 43505 73294 7.25 0.44 345 400 0.00 
1984.1 41411 63032 6.57 0.42 355 475 0.00 
1984.2 42541 67491 7.02 0.44 365 550 0.00 
1984.3 44256 70139 7.85 0.42 375 625 0.00 
1984.4 44118 76315 7.68 0.45 385 700 0.00 
1985.1 43518 68171 7.33 0.45 406 750 0.00 
1985.2 43404 73019 7.21 0.46 427 800 0.00 
1985.3 43955 76034 7.96 0.45 448 850 0.00 
1985.4 45532 82851 7.96 0.46 469 900 0.00 
1986.1 44614 71317 7.43 0.45 552 1050 1.17 
1986.2 44588 78690 7.31 0.45 636 1200 1.15 
1986.3 44108 79271 6.57 0.42 719 1350 1.11 
1986.4 45154 87151 8.46 0.43 802 1500 1.06 
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Period CU C r (t+p)/y ATM EFTPOS PBaltB 
1987.1 41530 73336 8.03 0.45 922 1813 2.15 
1987.2 42673 78937 9.18 0.45 1041 2125 2.15 
1987.3 43808 81598 9.68 0.43 1161 2438 2.12 
1987.4 45355 86908 9.89 0.45 1280 2750 2.03 
1988.1 41809 75823 8.98 0.44 1371 3580 2.18 
1988.2 42230 78857 9.42 0.44 1463 4409 2.17 
1988.3 42365 81596 10.15 0.43 1554 5239 2.17 
1988.4 43990 83906 9.79 0.43 1645 6068 2.10 
1989.1 40618 73253 8.42 0.42 1669 6215 2.56 
1989.2 41141 78580 7.46 0.42 1694 6362 2.53 
1989.3 42665 81283 8.03 0.41 1718 6509 2.55 
1989.4 43125 84107 8.21 0.43 1742 6656 2.45 
1990.1 39049 73311 7.61 0.43 1750 7295 3.30 
1990.2 40529 79493 7.91 0.41 1759 7935 3.31 
1990.3 42074 82818 8.29 0.41 1767 8574 3.28 
1990.4 42800 85346 7.62 0.43 1775 9213 3.17 
1991.1 39430 76289 8.17 0.41 1780 9988 3.53 
1991.2 39223 81526 7.53 0.41 1785 10762 3.50 
1991.3 41625 87264 8.13 0.41 1789 11537 3.48 
1991.4 43237 89653 8.18 0.42 1794 12311 3.41 
1992.1 39382 77970 8.19 0.41 1779 13101 3.29 
1992.2 40550 84873 7.25 0.42 1765 13891 3.28 
1992.3 42050 89074 8.49 0.41 1750 14681 3.22 
1992.4 41870 91656 8.67 0.42 1735 15471 3.14 
1993.1 39609 79093 7.02 0.42 1728 16219 3.58 
1993.2 41303 85939 5.14 0.42 1721 16966 3.54 
1993.3 42220 93531 5.01 0.41 1714 17714 3.51 
1993.4 45523 95389 4.24 0.4 1707 18461 3.46 
1994.1 43746 83772 3.89 0.43 1716 21176 3.03 
1994.2 46197 89360 3.11 0.43 1724 23891 3.04 
1994.3 46764 95170 3.44 0.41 1733 26606 3.00 
1994.4 47526 98596 3.88 0.42 1741 29321 2.94 
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Period CU C r (t+p)/y ATM EFTPOS PBaltB 
1995.1 44235 85523 3.00 0.43 1754 30667 2.93 
1995.2 46936 92630 3.29 0.43 1767 32014 2.89 
1995.3 46671 99462 3.75 0.42 1779 33360 2.86 
1995.4 48013 100794 3.76 0.43 1792 34706 2.80 
1996.1 45783 91057 4.24 0.44 1809 35788 2.56 
1996.2 47304 95481 2.78 0.44 1827 36870 2.53 
1996.3 47147 103701 3.04 0.42 1844 37951 2.50 
1996.4 48992 106956 2.69 0.43 1861 39033 2.46 
1997.1 46118 91429 1.59 0.42 1870 40923 2.43 
1997.2 46347 100565 2.13 0.43 1879 42813 2.41 
1997.3 46208 108127 2.66 0.43 1887 44702 2.41 
1997.4 51047 112270 2.27 0.42 1896 46592 2.38 
1998.1 45713 93888 1.91 0.42 1908 48003 2.21 
1998.2 46661 102649 2.50 0.43 1920 49414 2.19 
1998.3 45905 111504 5.53 0.42 1932 50824 2.17 
1998.4 49026 112559 5.75 0.43 1944 52235 2.14 
1999.1 45898 99149 4.67 0.44 1960 53862 2.06 
1999.2 45476 103787 4.14 0.44 1976 55489 2.02 
1999.3 44228 114919 4.68 0.42 1991 57115 2.01 
1999.4 49434 116773 3.15 0.42 2007 58742 1.98 
2000.1 43613 102410 3.40 0.44 2035 60388 2.12 
2000.2 44700 109886 3.82 0.44 2063 62034 2.08 
2000.3 42996 116144 5.08 0.42 2091 63680 2.08 
2000.4 47340 119637 4.89 0.43 2119 65326 2.07 
2001.1 41925 103510 4.35 0.43 2125 66917 2.10 
2001.2 43002 110993 4.60 0.44 2132 68507 2.08 
2001.3 41943 116240 6.88 0.43 2138 70098 2.12 
2001.4 46957 122641 5.37 0.43 2144 71688 2.12 
2002.1 42336 106739 4.85 0.43 2155 73793 1.96 
2002.2 41754 115383 4.74 0.44 2166 75897 1.94 
2002.3 40108 119268 5.83 0.43 2177 78002 1.94 
2002.4 44829 127012 4.63 0.43 2188 80106 1.94 
  85
Period CU C r (t+p)/y ATM EFTPOS PBaltB 
2003.1 39391 108221 2.08 0.44 2150 82889 1.91 
2003.2 40836 118964 5.53 0.44 2112 85673 1.90 
2003.3 40062 124887 2.63 0.43 2073 88456 1.91 
2003.4 46258 132934 1.36 0.44 2035 91239 1.92 
2004.1 41531 114781 1.27     
2004.2 42847 123651 0.66     
 
Notes:  
Capital letters indicate that the variables are in levels.  
Exceptions: r and the variables in the ration (t+p)/y are both in levels, see specifications of 
variables at p. 50.  
Real currency (CU) and real consumption (C) are given in millions of 2001 NOK. 
Real currency (CU), real consumption (C) and real price of using alternative payment 
instruments are all obtained by deflating the nominal values by the (POS) consumption price 
index (CPIC). 
The real interest rate is obtained by subtracting the CPI inflation rate from the nominal 
interest rate. 
The values for EFTPOS in the period 1980.1-1981.4, and the values for PBaltB in the period 
1980.1-1985.4 were set equal to 1 when log-transforming the data. The reason for this is that 
otherwise it is not possible to calculate the logarithm of these variables. 
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Table I.2: Data, nominal values 
 
Period 
Cash in 
circulation 
Point-of-sale 
(POS) 
consumption
Nominal 
interest 
rate CPI*  CPIC* 
Inflation 
(CPI) 
 
1980.1 17627 21600 6.97 0.35 0.34 3.61 
1980.2 18110 23474 7.08 0.36 0.35 3.48 
1980.3 19336 25789 7.15 0.38 0.37 3.02 
1980.4 19814 29561 7.33 0.38 0.39 2.46 
1981.1 18635 24143 7.48 0.40 0.40 4.96 
1981.2 19300 26871 7.59 0.42 0.41 2.94 
1981.3 20346 29087 7.67 0.43 0.43 2.72 
1981.4 21133 33297 7.88 0.43 0.45 1.23 
1982.1 19989 27121 7.99 0.45 0.45 4.41 
1982.2 20455 29851 8.06 0.46 0.46 2.23 
1982.3 21608 31818 8.07 0.47 0.47 2.72 
1982.4 22008 35345 8.38 0.48 0.50 1.75 
1983.1 20944 30222 8.32 0.50 0.49 2.74 
1983.2 21279 32158 8.40 0.50 0.50 1.60 
1983.3 22376 34587 8.36 0.51 0.51 1.40 
1983.4 23014 38772 8.52 0.52 0.53 1.27 
1984.1 21716 33054 8.71 0.53 0.52 2.14 
1984.2 22364 35480 8.58 0.54 0.53 1.56 
1984.3 23655 37489 8.88 0.54 0.53 1.03 
1984.4 24534 42439 8.87 0.55 0.56 1.19 
1985.1 23552 36894 8.96 0.56 0.54 1.63 
1985.2 24024 40416 8.91 0.57 0.55 1.70 
1985.3 25160 43522 9.04 0.57 0.57 1.08 
1985.4 27196 49487 9.14 0.58 0.60 1.18 
1986.1 25729 41128 9.18 0.59 0.58 1.75 
1986.2 26276 46372 9.22 0.60 0.59 1.91 
1986.3 27003 48530 9.52 0.62 0.61 2.95 
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Period 
Cash in 
circulation 
Point-of-sale 
(POS) 
consumption
Nominal 
interest 
rate CPI*  CPIC* 
Inflation 
(CPI) 
1986.4 28980 55933 10.36 0.63 0.64 1.90 
1987.1 26596 46964 10.90 0.65 0.64 2.87 
1987.2 27383 50654 10.79 0.66 0.64 1.61 
1987.3 28449 52990 11.02 0.67 0.65 1.34 
1987.4 30832 59080 11.32 0.68 0.68 1.43 
1988.1 28263 51256 11.43 0.69 0.68 2.45 
1988.2 28733 53654 11.18 0.71 0.68 1.76 
1988.3 28821 55510 10.92 0.71 0.68 0.77 
1988.4 30938 59011 10.70 0.72 0.70 0.91 
1989.1 28522 51439 9.66 0.73 0.70 1.24 
1989.2 29231 55831 9.10 0.74 0.71 1.64 
1989.3 30083 57313 8.69 0.74 0.71 0.66 
1989.4 31606 61642 8.83 0.75 0.73 0.62 
1990.1 28646 53781 8.97 0.76 0.73 1.36 
1990.2 29647 58149 9.07 0.77 0.73 1.16 
1990.3 31084 61186 8.88 0.77 0.74 0.59 
1990.4 32682 65170 8.94 0.78 0.76 1.32 
1991.1 30255 58537 8.88 0.79 0.77 0.71 
1991.2 30335 63052 8.58 0.80 0.77 1.05 
1991.3 32376 67874 8.51 0.80 0.78 0.38 
1991.4 34291 71104 8.68 0.80 0.79 0.50 
1992.1 31057 61487 8.65 0.81 0.79 0.46 
1992.2 32083 67152 8.31 0.82 0.79 1.06 
1992.3 33888 71785 8.79 0.82 0.81 0.30 
1992.4 34689 75937 9.05 0.82 0.83 0.38 
1993.1 31889 63678 7.85 0.83 0.81 0.83 
1993.2 33707 70135 6.10 0.84 0.82 0.96 
1993.3 34751 76985 4.97 0.84 0.82 -0.04 
1993.4 38003 79630 4.43 0.84 0.83 0.19 
1994.1 36134 69196 4.00 0.84 0.83 0.11 
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Period 
Cash in 
circulation 
Point-of-sale 
(POS) 
consumption
Nominal 
interest 
rate CPI*  CPIC* 
Inflation 
(CPI) 
1994.2 38029 73561 3.84 0.84 0.82 0.73 
1994.3 39034 79439 3.98 0.85 0.83 0.54 
1994.4 40454 83925 4.28 0.85 0.85 0.40 
1995.1 37047 71626 3.98 0.86 0.84 0.98 
1995.2 39853 78652 4.00 0.87 0.85 0.71 
1995.3 40048 85348 3.96 0.87 0.86 0.21 
1995.4 42069 88316 4.01 0.87 0.88 0.25 
1996.1 38920 77407 3.93 0.87 0.85 -0.31 
1996.2 40696 82142 3.63 0.88 0.86 0.85 
1996.3 40980 90137 3.63 0.88 0.87 0.59 
1996.4 43324 94582 3.32 0.89 0.88 0.63 
1997.1 40727 80741 2.63 0.89 0.88 1.04 
1997.2 41314 89644 2.54 0.90 0.89 0.41 
1997.3 41264 96557 2.83 0.90 0.89 0.17 
1997.4 46014 101200 2.85 0.91 0.90 0.58 
1998.1 41704 85654 2.86 0.91 0.91 0.95 
1998.2 42947 94478 3.03 0.92 0.92 0.53 
1998.3 42485 103197 5.79 0.92 0.93 0.26 
1998.4 46070 105772 6.32 0.93 0.94 0.57 
1999.1 42832 92526 5.54 0.93 0.93 0.87 
1999.2 43152 98484 4.86 0.94 0.95 0.72 
1999.3 42233 109736 4.48 0.94 0.95 -0.20 
1999.4 48020 113433 4.43 0.95 0.97 1.28 
2000.1 42178 99040 4.43 0.96 0.97 1.03 
2000.2 43936 108007 4.62 0.97 0.98 0.80 
2000.3 42390 114506 5.39 0.97 0.99 0.31 
2000.4 46952 118656 5.81 0.98 0.99 0.92 
2001.1 42034 103779 5.85 1.00 1.00 1.50 
2001.2 43608 112558 5.78 1.01 1.01 1.18 
2001.3 41591 115263 5.84 1.00 0.99 -1.04 
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Period 
Cash in 
circulation 
Point-of-sale 
(POS) 
consumption
Nominal 
interest 
rate CPI*  CPIC* 
Inflation 
(CPI)* 
2001.4 46633 121795 5.74 1.00 0.99 0.37 
2002.1 42002 105896 5.40 1.01 0.99 0.55 
2002.2 41900 115787 5.29 1.01 1.00 0.55 
2002.3 40188 119506 5.80 1.01 1.00 -0.03 
2002.4 44955 127368 5.79 1.02 1.00 1.16 
2003.1 39718 109119 4.89 1.05 1.01 2.81 
2003.2 41253 120178 3.88 1.03 1.01 -1.65 
2003.3 40262 125511 2.27 1.03 1.01 -0.36 
2003.4 46249 132907 1.84 1.04 1.00 0.48 
2004.1 41872 115723 1.42 1.04 1.01 0.15 
2004.2 43704 126124 1.25 1.04 1.02 0.59 
* Base year 2001 
 
Notes: 
Cash in circulation is calculated at end of quarter. 
Cash in circulation and POS-consumption is denoted in millions of NOK. 
CPI denotes consumer price index. 
CPIC denotes the specific price index, which only includes prices of the consumption goods 
included in the POS variable. This is the price index which is used to construct real values of 
currency in circulation and POS consumption. 
 
Sources: 
Cash in circulation and nominal interest rate: Norges Bank. 
POS-consumption and CPI: Statistics Norway. 
CPIC: Terje Skjerpen. 
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Appendix II. Construction of point-of-sale consumption variable 
The categories of private consumption 
Code  Description 
62A1    Groceries 
62A2    Non-alcoholic beverage  
62B1    Alcoholic beverage  
62B2    Tobacco 
62C1    Clothes and shoes 
62C2    Repairs of clothes and shoes 
62D2    Rent (house) 
62D3    Materials for repairs in rented house 
62D4    Services connected with house  
62D5    Electricity 
62D6    Fuel and remote heating 
62E1     Repairs of household equipment and paid housework 
62E3     Furniture and white goods 
62E6     Miscellaneous household articles and equipments 
62F1     Medicine, glasses and orthopaedic equipment 
62F3     Health services 
62G1     Purchase of private means of transport 
62G2     Spare parts 
62G3     Gas and oil 
62G4     Local and long-distance transport 
62G5     Other services in connection with transport 
62H2     Telecommunication equipment 
62H3     Post and telecommunication services 
62I1      Photo and information technology equipment 
62I2      Durable leisure equipment 
62I3      Books, leisure commodities 
62I4      Leisure service 
62J0      Education 
62K0    Hotel and restaurant services                
62L3     Private commodities 
62L4     Private services 
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62L5     Insurance 
62L6     Financial and legal services 
62L8     Norwegians consumptions abroad                    
62L9     Foreigners consumptions in Norway   
 
  
Calculation of private point-of-sale (POS) consumption: 
All the private consumption items that are shaded in blue are included in the private point-of-
sale (POS) consumption variable. The others are taken out, because it is believed that cash is 
not considered as an alternative mean of payment when purchasing these items. They are 
typically paid with giros. 
 
Calculation of CPIC (POS price index):  
This is a price index related to POS consumption. It is calculated as the ratio between POS 
consumption in values and POS consumption in constant prices. Implicitly this means that the 
individual price indexes are weighted by their value shares in relation to the value of POS 
consumption. 
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Appendix III. Calculation of the variable PBaltB (price alternative payment instruments) 
 
Table III.1. Annual data series, which are of relevance for the construction of PBaltBB 
Period 
Transactions 
Cards 
(millions) 
Transactions 
Bank card 
(millions) 
Price  
Bank card 
(NOK) 
Transactions 
Cheque 
(millions) 
Price 
Cheque 
(NOK) 
1980 0.00 Missing 0.00 92.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 Missing 0.00 92.00 0.00 
1982 1.00 Missing 0.00 92.00 0.00 
1983 2.00 Missing 0.00 94.00 0.00 
1984 3.50 Missing 0.00 101.00 0.00 
1985 4.50 Missing 0.00 86.00 0.00 
1986 7.50 Missing 0.00 70.00 0.75 
1987 13.75 9.64 1.00 76.00 1.50 
1988 30.34 14.20 1.00 72.20 1.90 
1989 40.81 19.00 1.00 60.30 2.70 
1990 53.51 24.60 1.44 50.00 4.31 
1991 58.90 33.30 1.11 46.20 5.36 
1992 76.60 46.00 1.16 38.10 6.42 
1993 97.40 63.04 1.87 31.60 8.05 
1994 123.10 83.90 1.88 26.30 8.22 
1995 143.40 103.80 2.02 22.40 8.82 
1996 182.50 137.60 2.05 17.10 8.89 
1997 234.70 184.20 2.20 12.90 9.81 
1998 288.60 234.80 2.13 9.40 10.59 
1999 338.80 282.70 2.07 6.30 12.31 
2000 391.60 342.50 2.19 4.00 15.07 
2001 446.10 394.70 2.24 2.90 21.06 
2002 500.80 451.70 2.07 2.00 21.75 
2003 575.50 519.40 2.07 1.50 22.54 
Weight:      
1. quarter 0.213 0.213  0.213  
2. quarter 0.253 0.253  0.253  
3. quarter 0.253 0.253  0.253  
4. quarter 0.281 0.281  0.281  
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Notes, Weight: 
These weights are used when transforming the annual data series into quarterly data series. 
There exist monthly data on the total number of transactions with card for 2000-2003 (BBS). I 
have used these numbers to derive the seasonal weights given above. Then I have assumed 
that the same seasonal pattern is also present in the rest of the sample, and I have derived 
quarterly data for the whole data sample by applying this assumption. 
 
Explanation of the data: 
Total transactions with cards (in million of transactions):  
In other words, total use of EFTPOS terminals. This includes use of bank cards, domestic 
credit cards, payment issued by international credit card companies and oil companies’ cards. 
1980-1988: Estimates done by Gresvik and Kaloudis (2001). 
1989-1990: Numbers are from Norges Bank (1990, 1991).   
1991-2003: Numbers are from Norges Bank (2001, 2004a).  
 
Transactions with bank cards (in million of transactions): 
1987-1990: Numbers taken from Norges Banks annual report for the respective years. 
1991-1994: Numbers from Norges Bank (2001). I have estimated bank cards used in the 
banks payment terminals as 96.4% of the total use of cards in the banks terminals. 
1994-2003: Numbers from Norges Bank (2004a)  
 
Price per transaction when using bank card: 
There are only prices in connection with using bank cards. To use the other types of payment 
cards is free. 
1982-1986: Price assumed to be equal to 0. 
1987-1989: Assumption, price equal to 1. 
1980-1989: There are no prices registered for use of cards. However we know that prices for 
using card existed at least for the last couple of years. EFTPOS terminals were introduced in 
1982. 
1990-2003: Actual prices, numbers from Norges Banks annual reports on payment system. 
 
Total transactions when using cheques (in millions of transactions): 
1980-1981: Estimates done by Gresvik and Kaloudis (2001). 
1982-2003: Actual numbers, taken from Norges Banks annual reports. 
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Price per transaction when using cheque: 
The price is an average of the prices per transaction when using personal cheques and 
business cheques.  
1980-1985: No pricing on use of cheque.  
1986: Estimate, average price of the years 1985 and 1987. 
1987-1988: Numbers from appendix in Norges Banks (1990). The numbers are                   
calculated in a different way than in the other years, they represent average fee per 
transaction. 
1989: Estimate, average price of the years 1988 and 1990. 
1990-2003: Actual numbers from Norges Bank (2001, 2004a). 
 
Table III.2. Quarterly data series involved in the construction of the variable P BaltB  
 
Period 
Transactions 
cards 
(millions) 
Transactions
Bank card 
(millions) 
Price 
Bank 
Card 
(NOK)
Transactions
Cheque 
(millions) 
Price 
Cheque 
(NOK) 
Total 
Transactions 
Nominal 
Price 
1980.1 0.00 Missing 0.00 19.60 0.00 19.60 0.00 
1980.2 0.00 Missing 0.00 23.28 0.00 23.28 0.00 
1980.3 0.00 Missing 0.00 23.28 0.00 23.28 0.00 
1980.4 0.00 Missing 0.00 25.85 0.00 25.85 0.00 
1981.1 0.00 Missing 0.00 19.60 0.00 19.60 0.00 
1981.2 0.00 Missing 0.00 23.28 0.00 23.28 0.00 
1981.3 0.00 Missing 0.00 23.28 0.00 23.28 0.00 
1981.4 0.00 Missing 0.00 25.85 0.00 25.85 0.00 
1982.1 0.21 Missing 0.00 19.60 0.00 19.81 0.00 
1982.2 0.25 Missing 0.00 23.28 0.00 23.53 0.00 
1982.3 0.25 Missing 0.00 23.28 0.00 23.53 0.00 
1982.4 0.28 Missing 0.00 25.85 0.00 26.13 0.00 
1983.1 0.43 Missing 0.00 20.02 0.00 20.45 0.00 
1983.2 0.51 Missing 0.00 23.78 0.00 24.29 0.00 
1983.3 0.51 Missing 0.00 23.78 0.00 24.29 0.00 
1983.4 0.56 Missing 0.00 26.41 0.00 26.98 0.00 
1984.1 0.75 Missing 0.00 21.51 0.00 22.26 0.00 
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Period 
Transactions 
cards 
(millions) 
Transactions
Bank card 
(millions) 
Price 
Bank 
Card 
(NOK)
Transactions
Cheque 
(millions) 
Price 
Cheque 
(NOK) 
Total 
Transactions 
Nominal 
Price 
1984.2 0.89 Missing 0.00 25.55 0.00 26.44 0.00 
1984.3 0.89 Missing 0.00 25.55 0.00 26.44 0.00 
1984.4 0.98 Missing 0.00 28.38 0.00 29.36 0.00 
1985.1 0.96 Missing 0.00 18.32 0.00 19.28 0.00 
1985.2 1.14 Missing 0.00 21.76 0.00 22.90 0.00 
1985.3 1.14 Missing 0.00 21.76 0.00 22.90 0.00 
1985.4 1.26 Missing 0.00 24.17 0.00 25.43 0.00 
1986.1 1.60 Missing 0.00 14.91 0.75 16.51 0.68 
1986.2 1.90 Missing 0.00 17.71 0.75 19.61 0.68 
1986.3 1.90 Missing 0.00 17.71 0.75 19.61 0.68 
1986.4 2.11 Missing 0.00 19.67 0.75 21.78 0.68 
1987.1 2.93 2.05 1.00 16.19 1.50 19.12 1.38 
1987.2 3.48 2.44 1.00 19.23 1.50 22.71 1.38 
1987.3 3.48 2.44 1.00 19.23 1.50 22.71 1.38 
1987.4 3.86 2.71 1.00 21.36 1.50 25.22 1.38 
1988.1 6.46 3.02 1.00 15.38 1.90 21.84 1.48 
1988.2 7.68 3.59 1.00 18.27 1.90 25.94 1.48 
1988.3 7.68 3.59 1.00 18.27 1.90 25.94 1.48 
1988.4 8.53 3.99 1.00 20.29 1.90 28.81 1.48 
1989.1 8.69 4.05 1.00 12.84 2.70 21.54 1.80 
1989.2 10.33 4.81 1.00 15.26 2.70 25.58 1.80 
1989.3 10.33 4.81 1.00 15.26 2.70 25.58 1.80 
1989.4 11.47 5.34 1.00 16.94 2.70 28.41 1.80 
1990.1 11.40 5.24 1.44 10.65 4.31 22.05 2.42 
1990.2 13.54 6.22 1.44 12.65 4.31 26.19 2.42 
1990.3 13.54 6.22 1.44 12.65 4.31 26.19 2.42 
1990.4 15.04 6.91 1.44 14.05 4.31 29.09 2.42 
1991.1 12.55 7.09 1.11 9.84 5.36 22.39 2.71 
1991.2 14.90 8.43 1.11 11.69 5.36 26.59 2.71 
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Period 
Transactions 
cards 
(millions) 
Transactions
Bank card 
(millions) 
Price 
Bank 
Card 
(NOK)
Transactions
Cheque 
(millions) 
Price 
Cheque 
(NOK) 
Total 
Transactions 
Nominal 
Price 
1991.3 14.90 8.43 1.11 11.69 5.36 26.59 2.71 
1991.4 16.55 9.36 1.11 12.98 5.36 29.53 2.71 
1992.1 16.32 9.80 1.16 8.12 6.42 24.43 2.60 
1992.2 19.38 11.64 1.16 9.64 6.42 29.02 2.60 
1992.3 19.38 11.64 1.16 9.64 6.42 29.02 2.60 
1992.4 21.52 12.93 1.16 10.71 6.42 32.23 2.60 
1993.1 20.75 13.43 1.87 6.73 8.05 27.48 2.89 
1993.2 24.64 15.95 1.87 7.99 8.05 32.64 2.89 
1993.3 24.64 15.95 1.87 7.99 8.05 32.64 2.89 
1993.4 27.37 17.71 1.87 8.88 8.05 36.25 2.89 
1994.1 26.22 17.87 1.88 5.60 8.22 31.82 2.50 
1994.2 31.14 21.23 1.88 6.65 8.22 37.80 2.50 
1994.3 31.14 21.23 1.88 6.65 8.22 37.80 2.50 
1994.4 34.59 23.58 1.88 7.39 8.22 41.98 2.50 
1995.1 30.54 22.11 2.02 4.77 8.82 35.32 2.46 
1995.2 36.28 26.26 2.02 5.67 8.82 41.95 2.46 
1995.3 36.28 26.26 2.02 5.67 8.82 41.95 2.46 
1995.4 40.30 29.17 2.02 6.29 8.82 46.59 2.46 
1996.1 38.87 29.31 2.05 3.64 8.89 42.51 2.17 
1996.2 46.17 34.81 2.05 4.33 8.89 50.50 2.17 
1996.3 46.17 34.81 2.05 4.33 8.89 50.50 2.17 
1996.4 51.28 38.67 2.05 4.81 8.89 56.09 2.17 
1997.1 49.99 39.23 2.20 2.75 9.81 52.74 2.15 
1997.2 59.38 46.60 2.20 3.26 9.81 62.64 2.15 
1997.3 59.38 46.60 2.20 3.26 9.81 62.64 2.15 
1997.4 65.95 51.76 2.20 3.62 9.81 69.58 2.15 
1998.1 61.47 50.01 2.13 2.00 10.59 63.47 2.01 
1998.2 73.02 59.40 2.13 2.38 10.59 75.39 2.01 
1998.3 73.02 59.40 2.13 2.38 10.59 75.39 2.01 
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Period 
Transactions 
cards 
(millions) 
Transactions
Bank card 
(millions) 
Price 
Bank 
Card 
(NOK)
Transactions
Cheque 
(millions) 
Price 
Cheque 
(NOK) 
Total 
Transactions 
Nominal 
Price 
1998.4 81.10 65.98 2.13 2.64 10.59 83.74 2.01 
1999.1 72.16 60.22 2.07 1.34 12.31 73.51 1.92 
1999.2 85.72 71.52 2.07 1.59 12.31 87.31 1.92 
1999.3 85.72 71.52 2.07 1.59 12.31 87.31 1.92 
1999.4 95.20 79.44 2.07 1.77 12.31 96.97 1.92 
2000.1 83.41 72.95 2.19 0.85 15.07 84.26 2.05 
2000.2 99.07 86.65 2.19 1.01 15.07 100.09 2.05 
2000.3 99.07 86.65 2.19 1.01 15.07 100.09 2.05 
2000.4 110.04 96.24 2.19 1.12 15.07 111.16 2.05 
2001.1 95.02 84.07 2.24 0.62 21.06 95.64 2.11 
2001.2 112.86 99.86 2.24 0.73 21.06 113.60 2.11 
2001.3 112.86 99.86 2.24 0.73 21.06 113.60 2.11 
2001.4 125.35 110.91 2.24 0.81 21.06 126.17 2.11 
2002.1 106.67 96.21 2.07 0.43 21.75 107.10 1.95 
2002.2 126.70 114.28 2.07 0.51 21.75 127.21 1.95 
2002.3 126.70 114.28 2.07 0.51 21.75 127.21 1.95 
2002.4 140.72 126.93 2.07 0.56 21.75 141.29 1.95 
2003.1 122.58 110.63 2.07 0.32 22.54 122.90 1.92 
2003.2 145.60 131.41 2.07 0.38 22.54 145.98 1.92 
2003.3 145.60 131.41 2.07 0.38 22.54 145.98 1.92 
2003.4 161.72 145.95 2.07 0.42 22.54 162.14 1.92 
 
Notes: 
Total transactions: Denotes the sum of transactions (in millions) where either cards or cheques 
are used as the payment instrument. 
Nominal Price: Denotes the average nominal price per transaction, when an alternative 
payment instrument to cash is used.  
The average real price per transaction for the use of an alternative payment instrument to cash 
is obtained by deflating the nominal price by the price index for (POS) consumption. 
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Appendix IV. Calculation t-values on long-run 
 
Assume that the empirical equilibrium correction term is given by: 
 
( )1211112111 ˆˆˆˆˆˆ −−−−−− −−=++ tttttt rccurccu ρραββα , where 2,1ˆ
ˆ
ˆ =−= iforii α
βρ  
 
Then the large-sample variance of iρˆ can be approximated as, see Kmenta (1997, p. 486) for a 
more detailed discussion: 
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Table IV.1: Components involved in the calculation of he long-run t-values 
 
Values: Model 1 Model 2 
( )1ˆˆ βraV  0.0106 0.0056 ( )2ˆˆ βraV  0.0000053 0.0000051 
( )αˆˆraV  0.0087 0.0076 
( )αβ ˆ,ˆvoˆc 1  - 0.0064 - 0.0045 ( )αβ ˆ,ˆvoˆc 2  0.00019 0.00016 
c,1ˆδ  4.02 3.75 
c,2δˆ  1.64 1.47 
c,3δˆ  - 2.57 - 2.35 
r,1ˆδ  4.02 3.75 
r,2δˆ  0.0016 0.0014 
r,3δˆ  0.0812 0.0733 
( )cρˆraˆv  0.0899 0.0531 
( )cds ρˆˆ  0.30 0.23 
( )rρˆraˆv  0.000067 0.000054 
( )rds ρˆˆ  0.0082 0.0073 
 
 
t-values Model 1 Model 2 
cρˆ  - 2.13 - 2.71 
rρˆ    2.48   2.66 
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Appendix V. Output for models in Chapter 6 
 
Table V.1: Empirical measures and diagnostics 
 
 
Table V.2: Residual misspecification tests (p-values in parentheses) 
 
 AR 1-5 
     F(5,65) 
ARCH 1-4 
   F(4,62) 
Norm 
       χP2 P(2) 
Hetero 
    F(21,48) 
RESET 
     F(1,69) 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
0.9523 
[0.4529] 
0.6078  
[0.6942] 
0.3745  
[0.8647]   
0.1019 
[0.9815]   
0.3225 
[0.8620]   
0.7086 
[0.5885] 
0.1440 
[0.9305]   
2.7058 
[0.2585]  
2.2267  
[0.3285] 
  
0.8275 
[0.6877]   
1.2795 
[0.2331]   
0.5898  
[0.8172] 
 
0.8192 
[0.3683]   
2.2077 
[0.1415]  
0.3256 
[0.5698] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Sigma 
RSS 
RP2 P 
RP2 P-adj 
DW 
Mean(∆cuBt B) 
Var(∆cuBt B) 
0.019 
0.029 
0.901 
0.899 
2.14 
- 0.000937 
0.003106 
0.020 
0.030 
0.893 
0.891 
2.04 
-0.000360 
0.003191 
0.023 
0.044 
0.845 
0.841 
2.01 
-0.000360 
0.003191 
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Appendix VI. Forecasts for the exogenous variables 
 
Table VI.1. Forecasts for the exogenous variables 
Forecast 
Period 
C 
reference 
r 
reference 
CPIC C  
Case A 
r 
Case B 
2004.3 128607 1.28 1.020 130508 2.58 
2004.4 134276 0.66 1.025 137479 2.36 
2005.1 122237 1.05 1.027 119117 2.85 
2005.2 127953 0.91 1.031 128327 2.91 
2005.3 134254 1.68 1.030 134829 3.68 
2005.4 139212 0.65 1.041 142104 2.65 
2006.1 126042 1.73 1.044 123468 3.63 
2006.2 131344 1.67 1.051 132575 3.47 
2006.3 137344 2.50 1.051 139539 4.20 
2006.4 142590 1.52 1.064 146277 3.12 
2007.1 129010 2.51 1.069 127946  
2007.2 134407 2.39 1.077 136822  
2007.3 140145 3.20 1.078 144094  
2007.4 145136 2.27 1.091 150681  
 
Notes: 
C reference: are the forecast for real (POS) consumption used when producing reference 
forecasts for the demand for real cash. It is based on forecasts produced by Statistics Norway 
for private consumption. I have here assumed that the change in nominal POS consumption 
follows the same change as the forecasted nominal private consumption. The real POS 
consumption forecasts are then obtained by deflating it by the forecasts for the POS 
consumption price index (CPIC). 
 
r reference: are the forecasts for real deposit interest rate used when producing the reference 
forecasts for the demand for real cash. It is based on forecasts produced by Norges Bank for 
the folio rate. I have assumed that the change in the nominal deposit rate follows the exact 
same path as the forecasted change in the nominal folio rate. The forecasts for the real interest 
rate are then calculated by using the forecast for the nominal deposit rate produced by Norges 
Bank and the forecast for the consumer price index (CPI) produced by Statistics Norway. 
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CPIC: are the forecasts for the POS price index. I have here assumed that the forecasts for the 
change in this price index follow the same path as the forecasts for the change in the 
consumer price index (CPI) produced by Statistics Norway. 
 
C Case A: are forecasts for POS consumption used when producing Case A forecasts for real 
cash. These are the forecasts produced by an univariate AR(8) model for POS consumption. 
 
The AR(8)-model for consumption, which is used to construct the alternative evolution path 
of consumption, is given below (t-values are in parentheses). 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )34.225.244.295.320.627.732.2
ˆ204.0184.0199.0405.0569.0609.0006.0 876541
−−−
+∆+∆−∆−∆+∆+∆−=∆
−−−−−− tttttttt ccccccc ε , 
 
where tεˆ is the residual from the OLS estimation of the AR(8) model. 
 
r Case B: are forecasts for real deposit interest rate used when producing Case B forecasts for 
real cash. These forecasts are based on forecast produced by Norges Bank (2003) for the folio 
rate. 
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Appendix VII. Forecast results 
The tables below present the different forecast results that are obtained by Model 1 and Model 
2 under different assumptions about the evolution of the exogenous variables. 
 
Reference-forecasts refer to the forecasts obtained when the initial assumptions of the 
evolution of the exogenous variables are used. In other words the ones used in Section 6.3 and 
Section 6.4. 
 
Case A refers to simulation experiment no. 1, where forecasts are obtained using an 
alternative consumption path compared to the one used in the reference case. 
 
Case B refers to simulation experiment no. 2, where forecasts are obtained using an 
alternative interest rate path compared to the one used in the reference case. 
 
Table VII.1: Ex ante forecasts for demand for real cash (in billions of 2001-NOK), Model 1 
Reference-
case Case A Case B 
Reference 
case Case A Case B 
Intercept correction Forecast 
period No No No Yes Yes Yes 
2004.3 43.978 44.163 43.635 43.165 43.346 42.828 
2004.4 49.406 49.793 48.613 47.911 48.287 47.142 
2005.1 45.277 45.054 44.751 43.566 43.352 43.060 
2005.2 45.914 46.174 45.118 43.957 44.206 43.195 
2005.3 47.082 47.561 45.761 44.440 44.892 43.194 
2005.4 51.925 51.755 50.139 48.753 48.594 47.076 
2006.1 46.652 46.297 45.148 43.762 43.429 42.351 
2006.2 46.002 46.311 44.345 43.197 43.486 41.640 
2006.3 46.898 47.661 44.952 43.831 44.544 42.012 
2006.4 50.790 50.470 48.661 47.572 47.272 45.577 
2007.1 45.079 45.020  42.390 42.334  
2007.2 43.924 44.625  41.457 42.118  
2007.3 45.008 46.153  42.439 43.519  
2007.4 48.498 48.442  45.885 45.833  
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Table VII.2: Ex ante forecasts for demand for real cash (in billions of 2001-NOK), Model 2 
Reference 
case Case A Case B 
Reference 
case Case A Case B 
Intercept correction Forecast 
period No No No Yes Yes Yes 
2004.3 43.147 43.234 42.821 42.609 42.695 42.287 
2004.4 49.315 49.586 48.548 48.304 48.569 47.552 
2005.1 44.019 44.082 43.070 42.888 42.949 41.963 
2005.2 45.859 45.848 44.637 44.526 44.515 43.339 
2005.3 45.850 45.913 44.344 44.207 44.268 42.755 
2005.4 51.772 52.047 49.854 49.772 50.037 47.928 
2006.1 45.507 45.521 43.756 43.714 43.728 42.031 
2006.2 46.656 46.638 44.860 44.825 44.808 43.100 
2006.3 46.359 46.540 44.457 44.274 44.447 42.457 
2006.4 51.305 51.812 49.174 48.964 49.447 46.929 
2007.1 44.552 44.702  42.579 42.723  
2007.2 45.589 45.738  43.658 43.801  
2007.3 45.109 45.530  43.096 43.498  
2007.4 49.391 50.220  47.282 48.076  
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Table VII.3: Ex ante forecasts for demand for nominal cash (in billions of NOK), Model 1 
Reference 
case Case A Case B 
Reference 
case Case A Case B 
Intercept correction Forecast 
period No No No Yes Yes Yes 
2004.3 44.843 45.031 44.493 44.014 44.198 43.670 
2004.4 50.624 51.021 49.812 49.092 49.477 48.305 
2005.1 46.486 46.257 45.946 44.730 44.509 44.210 
2005.2 47.346 47.614 46.525 45.328 45.585 44.542 
2005.3 48.486 48.979 47.126 45.766 46.231 44.482 
2005.4 54.061 53.884 52.201 50.758 50.592 49.013 
2006.1 48.726 48.355 47.156 45.708 45.359 44.234 
2006.2 48.328 48.652 46.587 45.380 45.684 43.745 
2006.3 49.294 50.096 47.248 46.070 46.820 44.158 
2006.4 54.041 53.699 51.775 50.616 50.297 48.494 
2007.1 48.174 48.110  45.300 45.240  
2007.2 47.298 48.052  44.642 45.353  
2007.3 48.539 49.774  45.769 46.933  
2007.4 52.919 52.858  50.068 50.011  
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Table VII.4: Ex ante forecasts for demand for nominal cash (in billions of NOK), Model 2 
Reference 
case Case A Case B 
Reference 
case Case A Case B 
Intercept correction Forecast 
period No No No Yes Yes Yes 
2004.3 43.995 44.085 43.663 43.447 43.535 43.118 
2004.4 50.531 50.808 49.745 49.495 49.767 48.725 
2005.1 45.195 45.259 44.220 44.033 44.096 43.084 
2005.2 47.289 47.277 46.029 45.914 45.903 44.691 
2005.3 47.218 47.283 45.667 45.525 45.588 44.030 
2005.4 53.901 54.188 51.904 51.819 52.095 49.899 
2006.1 47.531 47.546 45.701 45.658 45.672 43.900 
2006.2 49.014 48.995 47.128 47.091 47.073 45.279 
2006.3 48.727 48.917 46.727 46.535 46.717 44.625 
2006.4 54.589 55.127 52.321 52.097 52.611 49.933 
2007.1 47.610 47.771  45.502 45.656  
2007.2 49.091 49.251  47.011 47.165  
2007.3 48.649 49.102  46.477 46.911  
2007.4 53.893 54.798  51.592 52.458  
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